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Foreign ownership and market power in banking: Evidence from a 
world sample 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Using a novel global data set with bank-year estimates of market power, we examine the 
impact of (i) the ownership status (foreign or domestic) of individual banks and (ii) the 
country-level trends in foreign bank presence on our market power estimates. We find that 
the ownership status of individual banks does not explain banks’ market power. In contrast, 
the country-level trends in foreign bank ownership have a positive and significant effect on 
banks’ market power that is primarily due to the fact that most foreign bank entry occurs 
through mergers and acquisitions and not through de novo penetration. We also find that the 
positive nexus between foreign bank presence and market power is considerably weaker in 
countries with well-capitalized banks. 
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1. Introduction 
Economic globalization is changing the entrepreneurial landscape in many developed and 
developing countries alike and the banking sector could be no exception. Claessens and Van 
Horen (2014) report that the percentage of foreign banks among total banks in a given 
country increased on average from 21% in 1995 to 35% in 2009, and in certain developing 
countries this increase was quite higher. The impact of increasing foreign bank participation 
on the market power of individual banks is still an under-researched area in the banking 
literature. In this paper we develop a new global data set that includes bank-year observations 
of market power of banks and study the effect of foreign bank ownership on these market 
power estimates. 
Our paper is asking two main questions. First, we ask whether the ownership status of 
banks, foreign or domestic, has a direct impact on the market power of these banks. We call 
this the direct effect of bank foreign ownership on the respective banks’ market power. 
Second, we ask whether the extent of foreign bank presence at the country-year level  has a 
bearing on the market power of individual banks. That is we consider whether a banking 
system with higher foreign bank presence in general induces changes in the individual bank 
market power. We call this the spillover effect of foreign bank presence on banks’ market 
power. 
To identify these relationships we adopt a two-step procedure. First, we estimate the 
market power of virtually all banks in the world for which information is available in the 
Bankscope database. We use the Lerner index, which measures deviations of prices from 
marginal cost, and the adjusted-Lerner index, which relaxes the assumption that banks 
function in a fully efficient manner. For the calculation of both indices we first estimate 
marginal cost with a semiparametric technique that allows for greater flexibility in the 
production technology of banks compared to parametric techniques. Thus, changes in the 
structure of the production technology across banks, countries and time are much less of an 
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issue. In doing this, we essentially provide a new index of market power for the largest 
possible time span and number of banking systems worldwide. 
In the second step, we examine the potency of the direct and the spillover effects. For 
the former, we use information from Claessens and van Horen (2014) to construct a foreign 
ownership dummy variable that takes a value of one for each foreign-owned bank in the 
sample at each point in time and zero otherwise. We find that the ownership effect is 
economically and statistically insignificant, indicating that there is no difference in the levels 
of market power between domestic and foreign-owned banks. 
In turn, we identify the spillover effect of foreign bank presence on bank market 
power using the share of aggregate foreign bank presence in each country at each year, while 
also controlling for the direct effect. In contrast to the direct effect, we find that a high 
foreign bank presence increases the market power of the average bank in the industry 
(whether domestic or foreign-owned). This effect is economically significant. For the average 
country, the increase from a 17% foreign bank presence in 1997 to 25% in 2009 implies an 
increase in the Lerner index by approximately 0.08 points. Considering that the average 
Lerner index in our sample is 0.22, the 0.08 point increase is a quite large effect. 
Our finding on the spillover effect is in contrast with the only two existing empirical 
studies on this issue. Claessens and Laeven (2004), using a sample of 50 countries, and Jeon, 
Olivero, and Wu (2011), using a sample of Asian and Latin American countries, analyze the 
impact of foreign bank presence on bank competition at the country-year level and find a 
positive relation between the two. 
 We also analyze some theoretically plausible heterogeneous effects in the identified 
positive relation between foreign bank presence and market power. We find that the positive 
effect of foreign bank presence on bank market power is smaller for better capitalized banks. 
Further, the positive effect of foreign bank presence on banks’ market power is primarily due 
to entry through M&A’s rather than de novo (greenfield) entry. Indeed, in our sample, two 
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out of three foreign banks are established in the host country through a merger or acquisition 
and not through de novo entry and this is the main channel leading to the positive impact of 
foreign bank presence on market power. The only country characteristic among those 
examined that somewhat reduces the potency of the positive impact of foreign bank presence 
on bank market power is the high difference in the financial-statement transparency between 
the host and the origin country. 
Our study is the first to provide evidence for a positive nexus between foreign bank 
presence and market power, along with certain bank and industry characteristics that affect 
the potency of this nexus. There are two differentiating characteristics of our study that 
perhaps lead to our unique findings. First, the semiparametric approach used for the 
estimation of marginal cost and, thus, of market power, is less sensitive to the choice of a 
functional form for the technology of banks. That is, our method allows for a very flexible 
cost structure and, thus, increased econometric efficiency in our market power estimates. 
Second, and thanks to our estimates of market power and the foreign ownership data by 
Claessens and van Horen (2014), we have a bank-level market power independent variable 
and the broadest coverage compared to all existing studies, with observations from 131 
countries over the period 1997 to 2009. In contrast, existing studies focus on the relation 
between foreign bank entry and competition/ market power at the country-year level. 
 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical 
arguments linking foreign bank ownership with bank market power and the explicit paths that 
can influence this relation. Section 3 discusses the data set on the banks’ market power along 
with the way this is estimated, and also provides definitions and information on the foreign 
bank ownership and the control variables. Section 4 discusses the empirical identification 
procedure and the estimation results. Section 5 summarizes the results and provides policy 
implications.  
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2. Theoretical considerations 
There are two main channels through which a relationship between foreign bank ownership 
and bank market power can be established. The first is simply that foreign banks may have 
different levels of market power compared to domestic banks (Braggion and Ongena, 2013). 
We call this the “direct effect” of foreign ownership on market power. The second effect is 
related to the fact that foreign bank presence in general can cause changes to banks’ market 
power. We call this the “spillover effect” of foreign bank presence on bank market power. 
It is a priori obvious whether the direct effect will be positive or negative. On the one 
hand, foreign banks have access to alternative sources of funds through their affiliates in their 
country of origin and could bring in more specialized and sophisticated banking products. 
Further, these banks are usually more cost-efficient (Bonin, Hasan, and Watchtel, 2005; 
Degryse, Havrylchyk, Jurzyk, and Kozak, 2012), as they have access to better technology, 
especially if their country of origin has a more developed banking sector compared to the one 
they penetrate. These attributes of foreign banks could allow them to exercise greater market 
power than domestic banks. On the other hand, foreign banks entering a new market face an 
informational handicap, at least in the initial period following their entry, that could force 
them to price their products more competitively and offer better loan terms to attract 
customers from existing banks (Sengupta, 2007). Such behavior would result in a lower 
price-cost margin, which is a common measure of market power. 
The direction of the spillover effect is again a priori ambiguous. Foreign bank entry 
can stimulate competition in domestic markets in general and put downward pressure on 
prices and margins (Levine, 1996; Beck, Ioannidou, and Schafer, 2012). This effect is likely 
to be particularly strong in the case of de novo entry, which adds competitors, and less so in 
the case of acquisitions, where a foreign bank takes over an existing domestic bank.  
However, there are also forces leading to a positive relation between foreign bank 
presence and bank market power. First, if the efficiency advantage of foreign banks forces 
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domestic banks to become more efficient themselves, this could lead to higher margins for all 
banks if the cost savings are not passed through to prices. The same effect could arise if 
foreign banks are able to exploit their superior know-how and come to dominate domestic 
markets in new innovative financial products. If this is accompanied by a large scale and 
rapid penetration of foreign banking, this mechanism will naturally result to a monopolistic 
behavior of many banks in the industry and the loss of competitive pricing of the 
monopolistic products, at least for some period of time. 
Clearly, the nexus between foreign bank ownership and market power could be 
affected by a number of bank- and market-specific characteristics. At the bank level, a 
comparative advantage of the foreign banks usually comes from their access to capital from 
their parent companies in the origin country. Given that capital requirements are now in place 
in virtually all countries, this advantage of foreign banks can translate into lower cost of 
capital and improved efficiency. However, if the capital market in the domestic banking 
system is deep and domestic banks are well-capitalized, this will weaken the implied positive 
relation between foreign ownership and market power. 
The opposite effect could prevail if there is a big difference between foreign and 
domestic banks in the way they finance lending. Usually, domestic banks have an established 
long-term relationship with their depositors and they tend to have higher deposits to assets 
ratios. In contrast, foreign banks have access to potentially less expensive liquid funds from 
their parent companies or the international interbank market. The practical implication of this 
status quo is that the banks with high ratios of deposits to total assets and limited access to 
cheaper sources of funds, will have a disadvantage in providing competitive terms of lending. 
In other words, a potentially positive link between foreign bank ownership and market power 
should be exacerbated when domestic banks rely mainly on deposits as their source of 
loanable funds. 
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As discussed above, a natural differentiating factor in the impact of foreign ownership 
on competition is the mode of foreign bank entry. De novo entry increases the number of 
banks in the domestic banking industry, which by itself promotes competition, while 
penetration through an acquisition leaves the number of banks unchanged (Martinez Peria 
and Mody, 2004). Clayes and Hainz (2006) further highlight that a foreign bank enters 
through a greenfield investment only if its advantage in screening new applicant firms, due to 
e.g. better screening technology, compensates its disadvantage of having no information 
about incumbent firms. If a foreign bank enters via acquisition, it acquires a credit portfolio 
that contains information about the quality of incumbent firms. In addition, the acquired bank 
can generate information by screening applicants and this generates an informational 
advantage for foreign banks entering via acquisitions. The mode of entry, thus, determines 
the distribution of information between foreign and domestic banks, which affects the degree 
of competition in the banking industry. For example, in Mexico during the so-called tequila 
crisis, foreign banks entered almost entirely through the acquisition of existing domestic 
banks, thus preserving the oligopolistic structure of the industry (Moguillansky, Stuart, and 
Vergara, 2004). 
The relation between market power and foreign ownership can also be affected by a 
number of characteristics of the banking industry. The study by Mian (2006) is the first to 
note that greater geographical and cultural distance from the foreign bank’s home country 
increases the bias of foreign bank lending toward larger and hard-information firms. This 
effect should be more potent when the domestic banking system is characterized by relative 
lack of transparency compared to country of origin of the foreign bank. The lack of 
transparency in the banking sector is usually attributed to the lack of self-discipline, 
especially in terms of information disclosure of financial statements to the public (Cihak, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, Martinez Peria, and Mohseni-Cheraghlou, 2012; Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 
2008).   
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Besides the two papers that are directly relevant to our work (Claessens and Laeven, 
2004; Jeon, Olivero, and Wu, 2011), our study is related to two large, but rather separate, 
literatures on foreign bank participation and bank competition/ market power. Claessens 
(2006) reviews and refines the full set of arguments linking the two literatures and identifies 
the limitations of the existing empirical evidence. Among other studies, Clarke, Cull, 
Martinez Peria, and Sanchez (2003) and Beck, Ioannidou, and Schafer (2012) find that 
foreign bank entry improves credit conditions for enterprises of all sizes, and Berger, Hasan, 
and Klapper (2004) suggest that a larger foreign bank presence leads to a greater availability 
of credit to SMEs.  
Detragiache, Gupta, and Tressel (2008) and Beck and Martinez Peria (2010) offer a 
less positive view of foreign bank participation by highlighting that foreign banks tend to 
select borrowers with greater creditworthiness (“cherry pick”), while domestic banks are left 
with lower quality borrowers. This, in turn can hurt the profitability of the domestic banks 
and their willingness to lend. Empirical research on the relative performance of domestic and 
foreign banks has produced contradictory results, with some studies finding that foreign 
banks do better and other studies reporting stronger performance of domestic banks; see 
Degryse and Ongena (2008) and Chen and Liao (2011) for reviews of the evidence. 
 
3. Variables and data 
The empirical model used to study the relation between foreign bank ownership and bank 
market power is of the following form:  
Litc = δ0 + δ1 Li,t-1,c + φ BFOitc + θ FBPt-1,c + δ2 Bitc + δ3  Xt-1,c + εitc .  (1) 
In equation (1) the market power L of bank i at year t and country c is regressed on its annual 
lag, a dummy variable BFO (shortcut for bank foreign ownership) that is observed at the 
bank-year level and takes the value one when a bank is foreign-owned and zero otherwise, an 
indicator FBP (shortcut for foreign bank presence) that is observed at the country-year level 
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and measures the extent of foreign bank presence, a vector of bank characteristics B observed 
at the bank-year level, and a vector of variables X observed at the country-year level. εitc is 
the stochastic disturbance, which includes individual bank fixed effects (dropped when we 
estimate our model in first differences), year fixed effects, and the remainder disturbance.  
 All variables observed at the bank-year level enter equation (1) contemporaneously, 
while the variables observed at the country-year level enter lagged once. This assumption is 
driven from the fact that country-level changes, like structural, regulatory and 
macroeconomic developments, take time to reach the market and have a bearing on the 
market power of individual banks. In contrast, BFO and the bank characteristics are most 
likely to have a direct and contemporaneous bearing on the cost structure and the pricing 
decisions of banks, as they describe individual bank strategies that can change in the short-
term.  
The rest of this section discusses our measures for bank market power, the foreign 
ownership variables and the control variables used in our study. The correlation coefficients 
between the explanatory variables that were used as determinants of bank market power do 
not give rise to any multicollinearity concerns. The correlation matrix can be provided upon 
request. In Table 1 we provide explicit definitions for the variables used to estimate equation 
(1) and in Table 2 we report summary statistics for these variables. 
[Insert Tables 1&2 about here] 
 
3.1. Measure of market power 
The measurement of market power has received much attention in the economics literature 
since the importance of imperfectly competitive markets was first recognized in the 1930s. 
The Lerner index (1934) remains to this day a popular measure of market power (and of 
competition) thanks to its simplicity and transparency. It is defined as  
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=
          (2) 
where P and MC are the price of bank output and the marginal cost of the production of this 
output. The Lerner index ranges between zero and one, with zero corresponding to perfect 
competition and larger values reflecting higher market power (less competition). The index 
can also be negative if P < MC, which is of course not sustainable in the long run.  
The Lerner index measures departures from the competitive benchmark of marginal 
cost pricing. This makes it a simple and intuitively appealing index of market power. The 
index has also often been used as a measure of competition. Although the link between 
market power and competition might seem obvious, it has been shown that the Lerner index 
does not always point in the expected direction when competitive conditions change (Stiglitz, 
1989; Boone, 2008). For this reason we interpret the Lerner index as primarily a measure of 
market power, with a further connection to competition a natural but not entirely 
uncontroversial possibility. 
Alternative measures of market power/ competition include the H-statistic (Panzar 
and Rosse 1987) and the profit elasticity (Griffith, Boone, and Harrison 2005). The H-statistic 
has been widely used in banking studies, but has a shortcoming when it is to be used as a 
continuous measure of market power. As Bikker, Shaffer, and Spierdijk (2012) point out, the 
H-statistic maps the various degrees of market power only weakly and thus cannot be viewed 
as a continuous variable. The profit elasticity (or Boone indicator) is a relatively new concept 
that has been used in several recent studies but has also received some criticism. For 
example, Schiersch and Schmidt-Ehmcke (2010) show that it makes critical assumptions 
relative to firm size and to market definition.  
Given that the alternative indices of market power/ competition are still open to some 
critique, we favor the Lerner index and its variants as our proxy for market power. The main 
reason for our choice is that the Lerner index allows variation at the bank level. This 
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advantage increases the richness of our empirical analysis as it allows studying both the direct 
and the spillover effects. Also, as Beck, De Jonghe, and Schepens (2013) readily argue, the 
Lerner index is a good proxy for current and future profits stemming from pricing power, 
while it is not constrained by the extent of the market. In contrast, other bank-level measures,  
such as the market share or Tobin’s q, can lead to measurement error because they also 
capture the rents extracted from being too-big-to-fail. Moreover, the Lerner index captures 
both the impact of pricing power on the asset side of the banks’ balance sheet and the 
elements associated with cost efficiency on the liability side. This is of particular importance 
in our analysis because of the implications of the foreign bank ownership for both the costs 
and the revenues of banks, as highlighted in Section 2. 
Computation of the Lerner index requires knowledge of the marginal cost. When such 
information is unavailable (as in most empirical data sets), the marginal cost can be estimated 
using econometric methods. A popular approach has been to estimate a translog cost function 
and take its derivative to obtain the marginal cost. Some recent work has shown that it is 
possible to improve on this methodology with semiparametric or nonparametric methods that 
allow for more flexibility in the functional form (Delis, Iosifidi, and Tsionas, 2013). We 
follow this new literature and estimate the cost function using a partial linear smooth 
coefficient (PLSC) model. We provide all the details for the estimation and the data cleaning 
process in Appendix A and here we just outline the advantages of this approach. 
Most importantly, the semiparametric nature of the method implies that no 
assumption regarding the functional form of the cost equation is made globally. An 
assumption is just made “in local neighborhoods of observations.” This is important as it is 
usually quite difficult for the researcher to be certain about the validity of the chosen 
functional form. In their survey paper, Reiss and Wolak (2007) are very skeptical about using 
a specific functional form to estimate a cost equation without a prior analysis of the data, 
since an “incorrect” cost equation can bias the estimation and inference of marginal cost to an 
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unknown magnitude and direction. The flexibility of the semiparametric technique also 
allows using large international samples of banks from different countries, without being 
concerned that certain banking markets in different countries or banks within the same 
country face or adopt different production technologies. Hence, this approach takes into 
account the heterogeneity in the production technology across banks, countries, and time. 
Delis (2012), Delis, Iosifidi and Tsionas (2012), and Wheelock and Wilson (2012) show that 
estimation of marginal cost using semiparametric and nonparametric methods produces 
significantly better results than parametric techniques and commonly used functional forms 
like the translog. 
The data used for the estimation of the Lerner index are from Bankscope and require a 
heavy cleaning process to avoid including duplicates in our sample. This literally involves 
examining each bank one by one and many times using information from the banks’ 
websites, mainly to examine the history of bank operation and ownership, the existence of 
subsidiaries with the same names with the parent bank, and the occurrence of M&As during 
our sample period. We provide all the details of this intensive cleaning process in Appendix 
A. 
We also use two variants of the traditional Lerner index. The first is the efficiency-
adjusted Lerner index, which takes the form:  
. = ,
itc itc itc itc
itc
itc itc
TC MC Q
adj Lerner
TC
Π + − ⋅
−
Π +
      (3) 
where Π is the banks’ profit and Q is the banks’ output, measured by the banks’ total earning 
assets. This index allows for the possibility that firms do not choose the prices and input levels 
in a profit-maximizing way. For the estimation of this index we use the exact same procedure 
as Koetter, Kolari, and Spierdijk (2012). 
The second variant of the Lerner index adopts a dual-output cost function. 
Specifically, many banks have a significant volume of off-balance sheet items that can be 
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considered as a distinct output besides the total earning assets that are used as our main 
output. The off-balance sheet items are produced using essentially the same inputs with the 
single-output model of the bank and, thus, the single-output model may be missing some 
important information. For the estimated dual-output cost function and its derivative, see 
Appendix A. 
In Appendix B, we report the weighted mean values of the estimated Lerner index by 
country and year, with market shares as the weights. The equivalent estimates for the 
adjusted-Lerner index and the dual-output Lerner index are available on request. These 
values are effectively a new worldwide index of banking-sector competition, with larger 
coverage compared to existing literature. The weighted mean values are 0.27, 0.21, and 0.22 
for the Lerner index, the adjusted-Lerner index, and the Lerner index with two outputs, 
respectively. The Lerner index ranges between -0.12 in Ecuador in 1998 and 0.82 (close to 
monopoly) in Cuba in 1997. The adjusted-Lerner index ranges between -0.18 in Paraguay in 
2002 and 0.82 in Cuba in 1997. We omit the discussion for the Lerner index for the two-
output case, as the results on this index are very similar to the other two Lerner indices. 
In Figure 1 we show the time trend in average bank competition for each of the three 
indices. In broad terms, all indices identify similar trends in competition for the 148 
economies over time. More precisely, average bank market power peaks in 2003-2004, 
declines in the period 2007-2008, and increases again in 2009 and 2010. This pattern may 
reflect the sharp increase in financial globalization before the financial crisis of 2007 and 
related reforms that are likely to have led to higher market power through cross-border 
M&A’s and increased efficiency, without an accompanying reduction in the lending rate. 
Evidently, the start of the global financial crisis coincides with a decrease in the market 
power. This may be related to capital losses and non-performing loans suffered by many 
banks, which reduced efficiency, or to the rising informational asymmetry costs faced by 
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banks during crises (e.g., adverse selection and moral hazard) that sharply increase the real 
cost of lending. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
3.2. Foreign bank ownership 
Information for foreign bank ownership is from the database of Claessens and van Horen 
(2014). As we follow their approach in our the data cleaning process to estimate bank market 
power, we have an almost identical sample of banks that we identify as foreign or domestic 
owned. Foreign-owned banks are identified as those with 50% or more of their assets owned 
by foreigners and we use this information to construct the BFO dummy variable (bank 
foreign ownership). This variable identifies the direct effect of foreign ownership on the 
market power of individual banks.  
For the country-level FBP variable, Claessens and van Horen (2014) construct two 
indices. The first index is defined as the percentage of foreign banks among total banks in a 
country (foreign bank presence) and covers the period 1995 to 2009. The second is defined as 
the percentage of foreign bank assets among total bank assets (foreign bank presence in terms 
of assets). Even though the second index can be argued to describe foreign bank presence 
somewhat better, it is only available for the 2004-2009 period because of missing information 
on bank assets for a large number of banks before 2004. The correlation coefficient between 
the two indices for the period 2004-2009 is as high as 81.1%. Thus, the large time span of the 
data set makes the use of the first index optimal for our study, whereas the index based on the 
market share of foreign banks is used in a sensitivity analysis.  
By using foreign bank presence in the same equation with bank foreign ownership we 
are able to identify the separate impact of the two on banks’ market power. Figure 2 presents 
a scatter plot of the Lerner index against foreign bank presence and the associated regression 
line. The regression line has a positive slope that is statistically significant at the 1% level. It 
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remains to be examined whether this relation continues to hold when controlling for bank 
foreign ownership and whether it can be interpreted as causal. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Based on the theoretical discussion of Section 2, we also hypothesize that the impact 
of foreign bank ownership on the market power of banks depends on differences in the 
banking-system transparency between the host and the origin country (Mian, 2006). To 
identify this potential heterogeneity we construct an additional variable on the difference in 
the financial-system transparency between the host and the origin country. Specifically, 
financial-statement transparency in our context measures the degree to which banks face 
regulatory restrictions on their accounting disclosure. This index is constructed based on the 
following five questions: (1) whether the income statement includes accrued or unpaid 
interest or principal on non-performing loans; (2) whether banks are required to produce 
consolidated financial statements, including non-bank financial affiliates or subsidiaries; (3) 
whether the off-balance sheet items are disclosed to the public; (4) whether banks’ directors 
are legally liable for misleading or erroneous information; and (5) whether the penalties have 
been enforced. The indicator potentially ranges from zero to five, where higher values 
indicate greater disclosure (i.e., more transparent financial statements).1 
For the construction of the distance variable we use a weighted distance measure 
between the host country and multiple foreign countries associated with the top five foreign 
banks in the host country.2 To be specific, we first calculate the distance between the host 
country and each of the foreign countries, and then compute the average weighted by the 
                                                 
1
 We also experiment with other differences between the host and the foreign banking industries. Specifically, 
we measure differences in terms of (i) restrictions on banks to own non-financial firms, (ii) entry barriers on 
banks, (iii) regulations in terms of the summation of the three previous regulatory characteristics, (iv) 
geographical distance between the capitals of the two countries, (v) institutions (information sharing, credit 
rights and property rights), (vi) culture, and (vii) banking-industry concentration. We include formal definitions 
for these variables in Table 1. However, the coefficients on the interaction terms of our foreign ownership 
variables with these distance variables are statistically insignificant. 
2
 Most of the host countries in our sample have fewer than five foreign banks operating in their respective 
markets. We keep a five bank upper limit in our estimations given that on average these top five foreign banks 
constitute over 99% of the foreign bank share in host countries.  
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percentage of assets held by each foreign country. Let  denote the distance between 
country c and country f in terms of characteristic k and 	denote the share of country c’s 
banking assets that are held by country f. The explanatory variable is constructed as 
 = ∑  ,         (4) 
where the summation is taken over the top five foreign banks. 
 
3.3. Control variables 
Consistent with previous studies, we include several control variables that are drawn from the 
literature on the determinants of bank competition to rule out other possible explanations for 
our results (e.g., Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2006; 
Delis, 2012). The bank-specific variables B include the ratio of customer deposits to total 
assets (termed deposits) to control for the level of bank deposits supporting total assets; the 
ratio of equity capital to total assets (capitalization) to control for bank capitalization; the 
ratio of loans to total assets (loans) to control for bank specialization (also used as a crude 
measure of liquidity); and the natural logarithm of real total assets (bank size) to measure 
bank size. Delis (2012) shows that well-capitalized and larger banks are able to set higher 
margins or have access to cheaper sources of funds due to scale economies and informational 
asymmetries. In contrast, a higher deposits ratio implies lower cost of intermediation funds 
and, thus, lower market power. In turn, loans is a measure of bank specialization, with a 
higher ratio relating to banks that focus on the traditional activity of credit provision.  
We additionally experiment with other measures of bank liquidity (liquid assets 
divided by total assets) and credit risk (non-performing loans divided by total loans or loan 
loss provisions divided by total loans), but we did not find significant changes in the results. 
It should be noted that the sample is smaller when including the last two variables, owning to 
missing data, while the definition of liquid assets in Bankscope is sometimes different 
between countries. 
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For the country-level characteristics we use a wide set of structural, regulatory, 
institutional, and macroeconomic variables. First, we use the entry restrictions index, which 
measures the degree to which all banks in a country face entry barriers. We construct this 
index using information from the studies of Cihak, Demirgüç-Kunt, Martinez Peria, and 
Mohseni-Cheraghlou (2012), Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2008), and previous versions of the 
latter study (details are provided in Table 1). This index takes a value from zero to 12, with 
larger values denoting more stringent entry restrictions.  
We also use the relative share of privately owned banks vs. that of the publicly owned 
banks (constructed in terms of deposits). This allows avoiding to falsely attribute the impact 
of foreign bank ownership (which usually corresponds to private ownership), to the 
associated impact of private ownership on banks’ market power. We note that poorer 
countries are associated with higher levels of public ownership of banks, which is consistent 
with the findings of La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer (2002). Further, we use the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index, which is defined as the ratio of the sum of squared market 
shares of each bank in the industry. Market concentration measures, such as the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index, have been considered in the past as measures of competition (Cetorelli and 
Strahan, 2006). There is now consensus that these indices are not accurate proxies of 
competition but they are nonetheless useful control variables as they reflect important 
industry characteristics (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2006; Claessens and Laeven, 
2004). 
Another important set of characteristics that can potentially influence the relation 
between market power and foreign bank ownership relates to the regulatory framework in 
which banks operate (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2006; Claessens and Laeven, 2004). 
We use three indices obtained from Cihak, Demirgüç-Kunt, Martinez Peria, and Mohseni-
Cheraghlou (2012), Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2008), and previous versions of the latter 
study. These indices represent activity restrictions, capital requirements, and supervisory 
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power. Explicit definitions of these indices are provided in Table 1. For a literature review of 
the relation between bank competition and regulation, see Degryse and Ongena (2008). 
Moreover, we control for the impact of the macroeconomic environment common to 
all banks that can potentially affect competitive conditions. We use the share of the 
manufacturing sector relative to GDP (manufacturing) and the net inflow of foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) suggest that the manufacturing sector is 
highly bank-dependent and the conditions in this industry can affect the market power of 
banks through both demand and supply forces. Clarke, Cull, Martinez Peria, and Sanchez 
(2003) provide evidence suggesting that foreign banks follow their clients abroad. Thus, the 
effect of foreign bank ownership on the banks’ market power might be overestimated when 
the net inflow of FDI and manufacturing are excluded from the analysis.  
In addition, we use information from the Heritage foundation on the size of the public 
sector, as measured by the ratio of government spending to GDP (government spending). 
Following the reasoning of La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer (2002), countries with a 
larger public sector are relatively inefficient, governments are interventionist, and protection 
of property rights is poor. Thus, we could observe a positive link between this measure of 
government size and banks’ market power. 
Along the same lines, we use the financial freedom index and the trade freedom index 
from the Heritage foundation. The financial freedom index measures independence from 
government control and interference in the financial sector. Higher values on this index 
reflect greater financial liberalization.3 The trade freedom index is a composite measure of 
the absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers that affect imports and exports of goods and 
services, with higher values indicating more freedom to trade internationally.  
We also control for the prevailing political ideology and freedom using the ideology 
of chief executives variable (left, center, or right) from Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and 
                                                 
3
 An alternative index has been constructed by Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2010) but its coverage ends in 
2005. 
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Walsh (2001) (updated until 2012) and the polity variable from the Polity IV project, 
respectively. These two variables are potentially important in explaining the competitive 
conditions in the banking sector, because banks operating in more democratic and more 
rightwing countries will have fewer restrictions that might not be captured by our regulatory 
variables. Finally, we control for the level of economic development by including the natural 
logarithm of GDP per capita, taken from the World Bank Indicators.4  
 
4. Foreign bank ownership and market power: Identification and results 
4.1. Empirical identification 
Two important identification problems are the dynamic nature of bank market power and the 
potential endogeneity of the foreign ownership variables. Concerning the former, Berger, 
Bonime, Covitz, and Hancock (2000) and Goddard, Molyneux, and Wilson (2004) suggest 
that even developed banking markets might be characterized by information opacity, 
networking, and relationship-lending, all of which impede competition. These elements cause 
persistence in the cost structure, profitability, and market power of banks.  
To account for these dynamics we include the first and/ or the second lag of the 
dependent variable among the regressors and use the GMM estimators for dynamic panels of 
Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998). In our analysis we use the two-step 
“difference” GMM estimator with robust standard errors corrected using the method of 
Windmeijer (2005).5 The consistency of the GMM estimator depends both on the 
assumptions that the error term does not exhibit serial correlation and on the validity of the 
instruments. To this end, we use two tests proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) to evaluate 
these assumptions. The first is the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions, which tests the 
                                                 
4
 We experiment with about two hundred other control variables from various databases. We do not find 
significant changes in our main results. 
5
 We prefer the “difference” over the “system” GMM estimator because the results on the specification tests are 
better under the former method. Specifically, we find that the lagged differences used as instruments under the 
system GMM procedure are rather poor instrumental variables. 
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overall strength of the instruments. The second test examines the assumption of no serial 
correlation in the error terms. 
Note that the error term obtained from the estimation of equation (1) is likely to be 
serially correlated due to the fact that the dependent variable is observed at the bank-country-
year level and some of the explanatory variables are observed at the country-year level. This 
problem is comprehensively analyzed by Moulton (1990). Thus, estimation is carried out 
using standard errors clustered by country. We also experiment with country-specific year 
effects, but this increases the number of instruments in the GMM procedure asymptotically 
and causes the Hansen test to be equal to unity. 
In estimating equation (1), endogeneity of the two foreign ownership variables can 
arise both from reverse causality and omitted variable bias. Reverse causality could emerge 
from the preference of foreign-owned banks to enter with monopolistic products with high 
markups, so as to generate higher profits. To alleviate concerns with reverse causality, all the 
right-hand side variables except bank foreign ownership and bank characteristics are lagged 
once. This is intuitive both statistically and theoretically. From a statistical viewpoint, the 
literature (e.g., Beck, Jonghe, and Schepens, 2013) suggests that explanatory variables in lags 
can potentially diminish endogeneity issues that emerge due to reverse causality. On the 
theoretical side, the banks are aware of their own ownership status and the ownership status 
of the industry when deciding on their cost structure and pricing policy (i.e., the components 
of the Lerner index). 
In turn, we reduce the omitted variable problem by using an IV-style instrumental 
variable. Specifically, we use the entry restrictions for foreign banks (ERFB) lagged once as 
an IV-style instrument. We construct this index with information from the studies of Cihak, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, Martinez Peria, and Mohseni-Cheraghlou (2012), Barth, Caprio, and Levine 
(2008) and previous versions of the latter study (details are provided in Table 1). This index 
ranges between zero and four inclusive, with higher values reflecting higher entry restrictions 
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for foreign banks. Given that BFO enters equation (1) contemporaneously and FBP lagged 
once, we identify the two variables by using both  ERFB and ERFBt-1 as IV-style instruments.  
Naturally, the entry restrictions for foreign banks affect foreign bank ownership and 
presence in each country: we hypothesize that foreign bank presence must be lower in 
countries with significant protection of the domestic banking sector. Further, it seems 
unlikely that these restrictions affect banks’ market power directly. The only way that ERFB 
could be correlated with the Lerner indices is through common regulatory, institutional, and 
macroeconomic developments that tend to move together. However, as discussed in Section 
3.3, in our empirical analysis we control for a number of such variables, and most importantly 
for the general entry restrictions common to all banks, foreign-owned or not. Thus, we 
distinguish between entry restrictions for foreign banks and general entry restrictions. We 
also control for year fixed effects, and other regulatory, macroeconomic, institutional, and 
political variables. Finally, we experiment with country*year fixed effects, the results being 
essentially the same.6 
Some of the control variables can also be considered as endogenous in equation (1) 
owing to omitted variable bias. Not treating them this way can bias the coefficient on the 
foreign ownership variable. GMM allows treating these variables as endogenous using lags of 
the instrumented variables as instruments (Bond, 2002; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 
2006; Roodman, 2009). We adopt this strategy despite its imperfections because finding 
instruments for all potential endogenous control variables is extremely difficult. We choose 
the lag-length of these instruments on the basis of the Hansen test of overidentifying 
restrictions.  
                                                 
6
 We run additional tests for the validity of the ERFB variable as an instrument as follows. First, we regress, 
using the fixed effects model, the two foreign ownership variables on the ERFB variable plus controls and we 
find that ERFB is negative and strongly statistically significant. Also, we regress, again with the fixed effects 
model, the market power variables on the ERFB plus the same controls and we find that ERFB is statistically 
insignificant.   
 23 
In light of the above, the full set of the instrumental variables in the baseline 
specification includes the contemporaneous and the first lag of the entry restrictions for 
foreign banks as IV-style instruments, and, as GMM-style instruments, the third lag of the 
dependent variable, the first lags of the bank-specific control variables and the second to 
fourth lags of entry restrictions. In the specifications with additional controls we also add the 
second lags of these control variables as GMM-style instruments. Use of these instruments 
yields Hansen tests that do not reject the null of overidentifying restrictions. We are 
examining the sensitivity of our results with even fewer instruments to avoid the too-many 
instruments problem highlighted by Roodman (2009). Our results are essentially unchanged. 
We also confirm, using the second-order autocorrelation test (reported as AR2), that our 
estimated equations do not suffer from serial correlation.     
 
4.2. Baseline results 
In Table 3 we report the results from the estimation of equation (1). The Hansen test shows 
that the estimated equations are not overidentified and the AR2 test that there is no second-
order autocorrelation. As expected, the values of the coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable indicate that market power is quite persistent. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
The specifications in Table 3 include the baseline models (columns I-III) and the 
models with structural, regulatory, macroeconomic, and institutional controls (columns IV-
IX). In the interest of parsimony, we do not include all these controls in the same equation. 
The coefficient of bank foreign ownership in column I shows that, controlling for bank 
characteristics, the average foreign bank in our sample has a Lerner index that is 0.178 points 
higher than the average domestically owned bank (the difference in the raw data is 0.03). 
Based on this specification, and given that the mean Lerner index in our sample is 0.22, 
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foreign-owned banks have a considerably higher market power than domestically-owned 
banks. 
In Column II we repeat the same exercise, this time using only the foreign bank 
presence variable. The results show that the stronger presence of foreign banks increases the 
market power of the average bank. This effect is also economically significant. According to 
the baseline specification, a 10% increase in foreign bank presence will increase, on average, 
the Lerner index of banks by 0.1. Considering that the standard deviation of foreign bank 
presence is 16.97 and the trend on this variable is increasing, it seems that the share of 
foreign banks is a very important explanatory factor of the bank-level markups. 
In Columns III-IX we carry out the same analysis this time including both bank 
foreign ownership and foreign bank presence. The results show that the statistical 
significance of the former variable disappears even for the baseline specification, while the 
coefficients on foreign bank presence remain essentially the same with those of column II. 
The implications of these results are then straightforward. The ownership status, foreign or 
domestic, of individual banks seems to play a minimal role in explaining banks’ market 
power, especially after controlling for foreign bank presence at the country-level. Thus, we 
can rule out a significant direct effect of bank foreign ownership on bank market power, but 
we do find a positive and significant spillover effect of foreign bank presence on bank 
markups. Worth noting is that the positive association between foreign bank presence and 
market power remains prevalent after controlling for structural, regulatory, macroeconomic, 
and institutional factors in Table 3. 
In Table 4 we first experiment with the foreign bank presence in terms of assets to 
examine the spillover effect. The coefficient on this variable is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The economic significance is half compared to foreign bank 
presence. This is expected because the assets-based variable incorporates the element that 
foreign banks can also be partially owned by domestic owners, whereas foreign bank 
 25 
presence characterizes foreign banks entirely as foreign-owned or not. Still a 10% increase in 
foreign bank ownership in terms of assets will increase the Lerner index by 0.04. For the 
average bank in our sample this implies an 18% increase in the Lerner index. Further, in 
column II we use as dependent variable the average Lerner by country and year (a country-
level Lerner index), with the results being essentially the same. These results also hold even 
after using the adjusted-Lerner and the dual-output Lerner indices (columns I and II of Table 
4). 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
The findings of Tables 3 and 4 are in contrast with the two existing studies on this 
issue (Claessens and Laeven; 2004; Jeon, Olivero, and Wu, 2011) that document a negative 
effect of foreign bank presence on market power measured at the country level. Intuitively, 
the increased foreign bank presence can increase the market power of banks for at least three 
reasons. First, foreign banks penetrate those banking sectors with profit opportunities. 
Usually the old regime of these sectors consists of banks with low-quality technology that 
miss-price risk. In these situations, foreign banks are better able to price risk through their 
technological advantage, and this leads to higher intermediation margins via higher 
intermediation prices. This effect is then carried out to the domestic banks, which will follow 
the new pricing schemes because they will, in time, gain access to the new technology.  
Second, foreign banks tend to lend to more creditworthy clients. From the demand 
side, these borrowers might be willing to pay higher margins, if they perceive foreign banks 
as less risky. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, foreign banks have the ability to offer 
new banking products compared to domestic banks. Thus, they become the monopolists in 
these products, at least for some time. Below we will also show that the positive impact of 
foreign bank presence on banks’ market power is primarily driven by banks entering through 
M&As and will offer further intuition behind our main results.  
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The effect of the control variables is in line with expectations and with previous 
studies. For example, Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) find that higher entry restrictions in 
banking markets are associated with a greater ability for the banks to charge a price above its 
marginal cost. In our sample we identify the same effect through the entry restrictions 
variable. Well-capitalized banks are those possessing higher market power, which can be 
attributed to their ability to raise capital more easily and perhaps more inexpensively. In 
contrast, banks with higher deposits have lower market power. This is consistent with the fact 
that the higher cost of deposits relative to other sources of bank funds, implies lower market 
power, probably because the marginal cost is higher. 
The impact of the structural variables is statistically insignificant. This result confirms 
that the structural variables, useful as they may be in revealing important structural 
characteristics of the industry, are not good proxies for bank competition (Claessens and 
Laeven, 2004). We find that more stringent capital requirements increase banks’ market 
power. This result has important policy implications in light of the discussions under the 
Basel accord surrounding the reforms in banking regulation.  
All the macroeconomic variables are statistically significant. In particular, the larger 
the manufacturing sector the lower is the Lerner index of banks, which is intuitive because 
manufacturing firms can use more collateral compared to service and retail enterprises and, 
thus, obtain lower lending rates. In turn, a higher volume of foreign direct investment yields 
lower Lerner indices because these firms can obtain financing from their parent company or 
banks operating in their host countries and, thus, do not need to borrow from local banks. The 
positive effect of higher government spending on banks’ market power is consistent with La 
Porta, Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer (2002), who suggest that large governments are 
interventionist and inefficient in protecting consumers and promote competitive market 
practices.  
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In contrast, trade freedom enhances bank market power. This may be due to the 
increased demand for funding that was observed following the abrupt abolition of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers in the last two decades. With respect to the political variables, we find that 
banks operating in more democratic and more right-wing countries have higher market 
power. One possible explanation for the effect of the latter variable is that competition policy 
is enforced less rigorously by right-wing governments; this is widely believed to be the case 
in the United States. Concerning the effect of democracy, we observe a considerable increase 
in the share of foreign bank presence over our sample period in many countries that are new 
democracies with no tradition in strong institutions and market-oriented policies. Yet, to 
reach a definite conclusion that the positive relationship between democratization and right-
wing governments is not a spurious correlation, a much deeper analysis is required involving 
addressing the causality issue that is probably beyond the scope of the present study. This is 
more so if we consider that higher economic development (as measured by the GDP per 
capita) is associated with lower Lerner indices. 
In additional robustness checks that we do not report owing to space considerations, 
we examine whether the relation between foreign bank ownership and bank market power is 
non-linear by adding the squared term of the two foreign bank ownership variables. We find a 
statistically insignificant coefficient on the squared term, while we still find that the level 
term of foreign bank presence is statistically and economically significant. We also 
experiment with many other bank-year and country-year control variables, the results being 
quantitatively similar.  
 
4.3. Heterogeneity in the results due to bank and country characteristics  
Up to now foreign bank presence seems to be the foreign ownership variable explaining bank 
market power. In this sub-section we use the theoretical conjectures of Section 2 to examine 
whether our main result on the spillover effect varies with specific bank- and industry-
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specific characteristics. We carry out this analysis by adding in equation (1) interaction terms 
between foreign bank presence and these characteristics. The choice of the variables to be 
interacted with foreign bank presence is guided by the theoretical discussion of Section 2. We 
also examine the interaction terms between bank foreign ownership and the same 
characteristics, but the respective coefficients are statistically insignificant.   
 Specifically, with respect to bank characteristics, we focus on the capitalization and 
deposits variables. In addition to the theoretical discussion in Section 2, we observe that in 
countries with higher than average foreign bank presence the mean capital ratios are 
significantly higher than in the countries with lower than average foreign bank presence 
(0.111 and 0.086, respectively). Similarly, the ratio of total customer deposits to total assets 
(deposits) is quite higher in countries with very low levels of foreign bank presence compared 
to countries with very high foreign bank presence. This is a crude indication that high foreign 
bank presence induces banks in the industry to hold significantly higher levels of capital, 
while they have significantly lower levels of loanable funds in the form of deposits. Then, 
this type of heterogeneity could have important implications for the relationship between 
foreign bank presence and market power.  
To provide inference at the mean of the main effects, we mean-center the variables 
used to construct interaction terms. We report the estimation results from this exercise in the 
first two columns of Table 5. We find that the positive effect of foreign bank presence on 
bank market power is smaller for well-capitalized banks and larger for banks with high 
deposit ratios, with the statistical significance of the interaction term including capitalization 
being higher. These findings suggest that if the banks in the host country are well-capitalized 
and have alternative sources of loanable funds, foreign banks will not have an advantage in 
lending and Lerner indices will be lower. Then, these characteristics of the host banking 
system are an important prerequisite for a neutral effect of foreign bank presence on market 
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power. However, it should be noted that the levels of capitalization in which the impact of 
foreign bank presence turns negative is very high.7 
In column III of Table 5 we present the results from a specification that includes an 
interaction term between the foreign bank ownership variable and the variable named entry 
through M&As. This variable equals the number of foreign owned banks that enter in the host 
country through an M&A over those that enter through the establishment of a new institution 
(de novo penetration), scaled from zero to one for expositional brevity. In our sample, two out 
of three foreign banks enter our sample through an M&A. The main effect of the demeaned 
foreign ownership variable comes out positive and statistically significant as before. The 
interaction effect is also positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, indicating that 
the entry through M&As is one of the main causal factors of the positive relation between 
foreign bank presence and Lerner. Thus, de novo penetration of foreign banks, along with an 
equally capitalized domestic banking sector, seems to be the sine qua non to avoid the 
buildup of market power. 
In line with our arguments in Section 4.2 on the positive relation between foreign 
bank presence and market power, we can provide some further explanations of this important 
finding. First, a foreign bank usually brings in its own, many times superior, technology in 
pricing risk and this can lead to a change in the pricing decisions compared to the acquired 
domestic-owned bank. To avoid losses associated with very risky borrowers of the old regime 
that get hegemonic loan deals, the foreign bank could charge higher rates instead of 
potentially dropping these strategic relationships. Indeed, foreign banks frequently enter a 
country via M&A's, instead of de novo penetration, to benefit from the comparative 
advantage in relationship lending of the existing domestic bank.  
Second, there is a very possible efficiency effect (Bonin, Hasan, and Watchtel, 2005; 
Degryse, Havrylchyk, Jurzyk, and Kozak, 2012). Foreign banks mainly acquire domestic 
                                                 
7
 Specifically, it would take a capitalization ratio equal to 0.43 for this to happen. 
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banks with high cost inefficiency and the new bank, after the M&A, tends to reduce marginal 
costs, which increases the Lerner index. On the same line, a recent strand of literature 
(Martinez Peria and Mody, 2004) suggests that cross-border M&As in banking are value 
destructing because of high inefficiency of the old domestic bank. The new bank entering 
through an M&A will lower costs, giving rise to higher Lerner indices. All in all, we have to 
keep in mind that there is a reason for the acquisition. Even in developed countries, the 
acquired bank usually is a low-performance institution or a government-owned one with no 
clear profit-maximizing objective.  
In column IV of Table 5 we examine whether our main result on the spillover effect 
varies with differences in financial-statement transparency. We observe that the estimated 
coefficient of foreign bank presence remains positive and significant and takes a value of 
0.009, which is very close to the baseline specification. The interaction term is negative and 
statistically significant at the 10% level. However, the economic significance is quite high: 
for a large gap in the financial-statement transparency between the host and the origin 
country, the positive effect of foreign bank presence on Lerner becomes only 0.009-
0.006=0.003 and is statistically insignificant. Intuitively, this implies that foreign banks from 
more advanced origin countries in terms of transparency and market discipline bring in their 
progressive reporting techniques and reduce informational asymmetries in the banking 
sectors of the host countries. This, in turn, seems to benefit borrowers, given the lower levels 
of market power.8    
As a final exercise, we consider the potential heterogeneity in the coefficient on 
foreign bank presence based on the time (years) since the foreign bank presence reached a 
                                                 
8
 Existing studies find that the geographical distance between the host and the origin countries, as well as 
cultural, economic, and institutional differences could also matter for the foreign banks’ location decisions 
(Claessens and van Horen, 2014) and for their lending behavior in the host countries (Mian, 2006; Beck, 
Ioannidou, and Schafer, 2012). Thus, we also examine whether the impact of the foreign bank entry on the host 
country’s banks’ market power depends on such characteristics. Definitions for these distance variables are 
provided in Table 1. Yet, the interaction terms of all of these variables with foreign bank presence are 
statistically insignificant. We also experiment with interaction terms including banking-industry concentration, 
GDP per capita, and growth. Again these interaction terms are statistically insignificant. 
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specific threshold. The rationale for including this variable is that the longer it takes foreign 
banks to dominate in a new market, the more acquainted they become with domestic 
practices and clientele, thereby facing lower informational and agency costs. To this end, we 
introduce interaction terms between the years since foreign bank presence reached a value of 
40% and 50% and we present the estimation results in Table 4. We find a positive and 
marginally statistically significant (at the 10% level) interaction term in both regressions. 
Even though the economic significance of this effect is relatively low, our findings do seem 
to suggest that the longer a country has high levels of foreign bank presence, the higher the 
positive impact of foreign bank presence on banks’ market power. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper analyzes the impact of foreign bank ownership on the market power of individual 
banks. We first collect bank-year data for all countries in the world to estimate the market 
power of banks through the use of the Lerner index. We carefully clean the bank-level data 
on a bank-by-bank basis to avoid double counting stemming from M&As and other 
inconsistencies of the Bankscope database. Then, we use these data to estimate the cost 
function with a semiparametric technique that allows for a very flexible specification and 
does not impose a specific functional form on the data. Our method yields observation-
specific estimates of the Lerner index for a maximum of 12,206 banks operating in 148 
countries during the period 1997 to 2010.  
Subsequently, we match our data set with that of Claessens and van Horen (2014) 
who have information on foreign bank ownership in 137 countries over the period 1995 to 
2009 (thus, our final sample is restricted to 131 countries over the period 1997-2009). 
Claessens and van Horen used the same cleaning process of the Bankscope database, making 
our samples directly comparable. Using the merged data sets we examine the impact of the 
ownership status (foreign or domestic) of individual banks on their market power (direct 
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effect), as well as the impact of the share of the number of foreign-owned banks to the total 
number banks in the industry (spillover effect). 
We find that the only significant impact comes from the spillover effect and that this 
effect is positive in the sense of a higher bank market power due to an increased foreign bank 
presence. This effect seems to be transmitted through the considerably higher number of 
foreign bank entry through M&As, instead of de novo penetration, as well as through the 
capitalization of banks in the host country. We also find that the positive impact of the 
country-level trends in foreign bank presence on banks’ market power is significantly weaker 
when differences in the financial-statement transparency between the host and the origin 
country are rather important. 
These results have important policy implications for regulators and policy makers 
alike. If increased competition is the requirement, then it seems imperative that the host 
banking industry is well-capitalized and that foreign bank entry is made through de novo 
penetration. Further, a concomitant abolition of entry barriers and an establishment of strong 
transparency in the functioning of banks is warranted. If, in contrast, competition is already 
rather strong and there are concerns about the stability of the banking system, the foreign 
bank entry through M&As and the protectionist policies are preferable to increase the market 
power of banks and their rents. Thus, a natural extension to our work would be to examine 
the real effects behind the positive nexus of foreign bank presence with banks’ market power. 
In particular, bank market power is usually linked to increased lending rates and, thus, to 
reduced welfare. Yet, a higher market power of banks increases bank profitability and can 
lead to increased financial stability. Given our findings, the special role of foreign bank 
presence in the bank market power-stability relation needs further examination. We leave this 
and other issues for future research. 
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Table 1. Variable definitions and sources 
 
Name 
 
Description 
 
Data source 
 
Panel A: Variables used in the analysis of market power 
Earning assets Natural logarithm of deflated total earning assets (measure of a bank’s output). Bankscope 
Price of output Total income divided by total earning assets. Bankscope 
Expenses Natural logarithm of deflated total interest expenses and total noninterest expenses 
(measure of a bank’s total cost). 
Bankscope 
Price of deposits Natural logarithm of total interest expenses divided by total customer deposits. Bankscope 
Price of labor Natural logarithm of personnel expenses divided by total assets. Bankscope 
Price of physical capital  Natural logarithm of overheads minus personnel expenses divided by fixed assets. Bankscope 
 
Panel B: Variables used in the analysis of market power 
A. Dependent variable 
Lerner index The ability of an individual bank to charge a price above marginal cost. Own calculations 
Average Lerner index The Lerner index averaged by country and year Own calculations 
Adj.-Lerner index Variant of the Lerner index which allows for the possibility that firms do not choose 
the prices and input levels in a profit-maximizing way. 
Own calculations 
Dual-output Lerner Variant of the Lerner index that adopts a dual-output cost function. Own calculations 
B. Bank characteristics 
Deposits Total customer deposits divided by total assets. Bankscope 
Capitalization Equity capital divided by total assets. Bankscope 
Loans Total loans divided by total assets. Bankscope 
Bank size Natural logarithm of total assets. Bankscope 
C. Main explanatory variables 
Bank foreign ownership Dummy variable  equal to one if bank is foreign owned (50% or more of their assets) Claessens and Van Horen (2014) 
Foreign bank presence The ratio of the number of foreign banks over the number of all banks. Claessens and Van Horen (2014) 
Foreign bank presence in 
terms of assets  
The ratio of the assets of foreign banks over the total assets of all banks. Claessens and Van Horen (2014) 
Country M&A’s The ratio of the number of foreign-owned banks that enter via M&A’s over the 
number of all banks (scaled from zero to one). 
Claessens and Van Horen (2014) 
Entry restrictions The index measures the degree to which banks face entry restrictions in the banking 
market and is constructed by adding 1 if the answer is yes and 0 otherwise, for each 
one of the following twelve questions: (1) Is more than one license required (e.g. one 
for each banking activity)? (2)  Which of the following are legally required to be 
submitted before issuance of the banking license: (a) draft bylaws (b) intended 
organizational chart (c) financial projections for first three years (d) financial 
information on main potential shareholders (e) background/experience of future board 
directors (f) background/experience of future senior managers (g) source of funds to 
be used as capital. (3) What were the primary reasons for denial of the applications: 
(a) capital amount or quality (b) banking skills (c) reputation (d) other? This index 
takes a value from 0 to 12, with larger values denoting more stringent entry 
restrictions. 
Cihak, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Martinez Peria, and Mohseni-
Cheraghlou (2012), Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine 
(2008,2004,2001) 
Private ownership The percentage of bank deposits held in privately owned banks were used to construct 
rating intervals. Countries with larger shares of privately held deposits received 
higher ratings. 
Economic freedom of the world: 
2012 Annual report 
Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index 
Hirschman-Herfindahl index of each bank's total earning assets (takes value from 0 to 
1). 
Own calculations 
Activity restrictions The score for this variable is determined on the basis of the level of regulatory 
restrictions on bank participation in: (1) securities activities, (2) insurance activities, 
(3) real estate activities, and (4) bank ownership of non-financial firms. These 
activities can be unrestricted, permitted, restricted or prohibited and on this basis the 
variable is assigned the values of 1, 2, 3 or 4, respectively. The index takes a value 
from 0 to 16, with larger values denoting more stringent activity restrictions. 
Cihak, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Martinez Peria, and Mohseni-
Cheraghlou,(2012), Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine 
(2008,2004,2001) 
Capital requirements  This variable is determined: (a) by adding 2, 1, or 0 if the answer is Basel II, Basel I, 
or other; in the question: Which is the regulatory capital adequacy regime?, (b) by 
adding 1 if the answer is yes and 0 otherwise in the questions: Does the ratio vary 
with market risk? Are the sources of funds to be used as capital verified by the 
regulatory/supervisory authorities?, (c) by adding 1 if the answer is no and 0 
otherwise in the questions: Can the initial or subsequent injections of capital be done 
with assets other than cash or government securities? Can initial disbursement of 
capital be done with borrowed funds? This index takes a value from 0 to 6, with 
larger values denoting more stringent capital requirements.  
Cihak, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Martinez Peria, and Mohseni-
Cheraghlou,(2012), Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine 
(2008,2004,2001) 
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Supervisory power  Index of the powers of the supervisor of the banking sector, reflecting whether the 
supervisory agency has the authority to take specific actions to prevent and correct 
problems in the banking sector. Takes values from 0 to 14, with higher values 
reflecting more supervisory powers (see Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2008). 
Cihak, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Martinez Peria, and Mohseni-
Cheraghlou,(2012), Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine 
(2008,2004,2001) 
Manufacturing The sum of gross output minus the value of intermediate inputs used in the production 
of manufacturing goods. 
World Development Indicators 
Foreign direct investment The net inflow of foreign direct investment. World Development Indicators 
Government spending  The level of government expenditures as a percentage of GDP. Heritage Foundation 
Financial freedom Index of banking security and independence from government control. Larger values 
indicate more freedom. 
Heritage Foundation 
Trade freedom A composite measure of the absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers that affect 
imports and exports of goods and services. Larger values indicate more freedom. 
Heritage Foundation 
Ideology The classification rule for the chief executive of each country is as follows: Right (1); 
Center (2); Left (3); No information (0); No executive (NA). 
Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, 
and Walsh (2001) 
Polity The polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). Polity IV 
GDP per capita Natural logarithm of GDP per capita. World Development Indicators 
Difference in restrictions The weighted difference in restrictions on banks to own non-financial firms between 
the host and the origin country. The weights are constructed as the % asset held by 
each foreign country. Hence, the weighted distance variable is defined as sum 
(weight* distance between host and each rank country). We follow the same 
procedure for the constructed of the weights for the rest of the variables below. 
Cihak, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Martinez Peria, and Mohseni-
Cheraghlou,(2012), Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine 
(2008,2004,2001) 
Difference in entry barriers The weighted difference in entry barriers on banks between the host and the origin 
country.   
Cihak, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Martinez Peria, and Mohseni-
Cheraghlou,(2012), Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine 
(2008,2004,2001), Bankscope 
and own calculations 
Difference in transparency The weighted difference in the banks’ financial-statement transparency between the 
host and the origin country.   
Cihak, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Martinez Peria, and Mohseni-
Cheraghlou,(2012), Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine 
(2008,2004,2001), Bankscope 
and own calculations 
Difference in regulations Sum of weighted differences in restrictions to own non-financial firms, entry barriers 
and in the banks' financial-statement transparency between the host and the origin 
country. 
Cihak, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Martinez Peria, and Mohseni-
Cheraghlou,(2012), Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine 
(2008,2004,2001), Bankscope 
and own calculations 
Geography gap The log of the distance (in km) between the capitals of the host and the origin 
country. 
www.infoplease.com 
Difference in institutions An index constructed by adding the differences in information sharing, credit rights, 
and property rights between the host and the origin country. 
The CEPII  
Difference in culture An index constructed by adding information on the language and colonial tie. If the 
language between the host and the origin country is the same, the first index takes a 
value of zero. The same holds for the colonial tie. 
The CEPII  
Difference in concentration The weighted difference in the concentration of total assets for the top 3 banks 
between the host and the origin country. 
Cihak, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Martinez Peria, and Mohseni-
Cheraghlou,(2012), Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine 
(2008,2004,2001), Bankscope 
and own calculations 
Years of foreign 
ownership>40% 
The number of consecutive years since when the foreign ownership variable reached 
a value of 40% or higher in a specific country (zero otherwise). 
Own calculations 
Years of foreign 
ownership>50% 
The number of consecutive years since when the foreign ownership variable reached 
a value of 50% or higher in a specific country (zero otherwise). 
Own calculations 
D. Instrumental variable 
Entry restriction for foreign 
banks 
This variable is determined by adding 1 if the answer is yes and 0 otherwise, for each 
one of the following four questions: Are foreign entities prohibited from entering 
through: (1) Acquisition, (2) Subsidiary, (3) Branch and (4) Joint venture. The index 
takes a value from 0 to 4, with larger values denoting more stringent entry restrictions 
for foreign banks. 
Cihak, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Martinez Peria, and Mohseni-
Cheraghlou,(2012), Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine 
(2008,2004,2001) 
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Table 2. Summary statistics 
The table reports summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis. The variables are defined in 
Appendix A. 
Variable Level Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Panel A: Variables used in the derivation of market power from 1997-2010 
Earning assets Bank 89,778 11.71 2.02 6.83 21.38 
Price of output Bank 89,778 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.71 
Expenses Bank 89,778 8.85 1.93 4.55 18.41 
Price of deposits Bank 89,778 0.06 0.09 0 1.03 
Price of labor Bank 89,778 0.02 0.01 0 0.09 
Price of physical capital Bank 89,778 1.70 3.71 0.13 56.96 
Panel B: Variables used in the analysis of market power from 1997-2009 
Lerner index Bank 80,725 0.22 0.12 -0.2 0.95 
Adjusted-Lerner index Bank 78,724 0.17 0.12 -0.20 0.95 
Dual-output Lerner index Bank 73,214 0.23 0.11 -0.20 0.95 
Deposits Bank 82,151 0.69 0 0 1.93 
Capitalization Bank 82,146 0 0.08 -2.58 1 
Loans Bank 82,083 0.61 0.19 0 9.36 
Bank size Bank 82,151 12.85 1.66 8 21.51 
Bank foreign ownership Bank 82,151 0.07 0.27 0 1 
Country M&A’s Country 82,151 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Foreign bank presence Country 82,151 20.60 16.97 0 100 
Entry restrictions Country 81,423 7.56 1.96 0 12 
Private ownership Country 72,775 7.65 2.46 0 10 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index Country 82,151 0.09 0.14 0 1 
Activity restrictions Country 81,454 9.01 2.51 1 16 
Capital requirements Country 81,593 3.53 0.86 0 6 
Supervisory power Country 81,543 11.05 2.27 1 14 
Manufacturing Country 80,575 17.93 4.55 1.82 35.63 
Foreign direct investment Country 81,980 5.62 34.22 -15.03 564.92 
Government spending Country 81,894 50.89 21.04 0 99.30 
Financial freedom Country 81,894 64.13 18.58 10 90 
Trade freedom Country 81,894 77.72 9.97 0 95 
Ideology Country 78,136 1.64 1.08 0 3 
Polity Country 80,559 8.88 3.19 -10 10 
GDP per capita Country 82,109 10.09 0.82 6.10 11.21 
Difference in restrictions Country 79,571 0.94 1.80 -2.76 3.67 
Difference in entry barriers Country 79,571 -0.22 0.62 -3.25 2.99 
Difference in transparency Country 79,571 -0.44 0.64 -4.10 1.94 
Difference in regulations Country 79,571 0.29 2.42 -4.90 7.16 
Geography gap Country 79,571 7.70 1 4.51 9.64 
Difference in institutions Country 79,571 0.48 3.06 -8.50 4.23 
Difference in culture Country 79,571 1.54 0.49 0 2 
Difference in concentration Country 79,571 -0.09 0.18 -0.49 1 
Years of foreign ownership>40% Country 82,151 0.59 2.13 0 13 
Years of foreign ownership>50% Country 82,151 0.39 1.70 0 13 
Entry restrictions for foreign banks Country 81,987 0.09 0.34 0 4 
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Table 3. The impact of bank foreign bank ownership and foreign bank presence on market power 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses). The dependent variable in columns I-IX is the Lerner index. The variables are defined in Table 1. 
All regressions are estimated with the two-step “difference” GMM estimator for dynamic panels and robust standard errors are clustered by country. Also, all 
regressions include year-fixed effects. Wald is the p-value of the Wald test, which shows the joint statistical significance of the coefficient estimates. Hansen is 
the p-value of the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions, which requires a value higher than 0.05 to accept the null (valid instruments) at the 5% level. AR1 
and AR2 are the p-values of the tests for the first- and- second-order autocorrelation, respectively. All equations include GMM-style instruments (lags) and the 
entry restriction for foreign banks (ERFB, ERFBt-1) as an IV-style instrument. The *, **, *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
 Bank 
ownership 
Country 
ownership 
Spillover 
effect 
Structural 
variables 
Regulation 
variables 
Macroeconomic 
variables 
Freedom 
variables 
Political 
variables 
GDP per 
capita 
Lagged dependent 0.470*** 0.386*** 0.349*** 0.287** 0.437*** 0.444*** 0.318** 0.326*** 0.393*** 
 (3.227) (3.684) (2.822) (2.205) (3.901) (3.439) (2.427) (2.801) (3.018) 
Deposits -0.340** -0.397** -0.371** -0.323 -0.321** -0.147 -0.292*** -0.334** -0.316** 
 (-2.201) (-2.445) (-2.339) (-1.427) (-2.073) (-1.054) (-2.810) (-2.429) (-2.165) 
Capitalization 0.613*** 0.815*** 0.868*** 0.875*** 0.703*** 0.769*** 0.795*** 0.768*** 0.932*** 
 (2.898) (3.984) (4.127) (3.685) (3.755) (3.129) (4.357) (3.394) (4.257) 
Loans 0.035 -0.078 -0.066 -0.068 -0.070 -0.061 -0.048 -0.015 0.038 
 (0.390) (-0.639) (-0.498) (-0.491) (-0.631) (-0.710) (-0.424) (-0.164) (0.228) 
Bank size 0.043*** 0.013 0.014 -0.002 0.005 -0.020 0.003 0.012 0.044 
 (2.790) (0.555) (0.570) (-0.092) (0.206) (-0.773) (0.159) (0.718) (1.467) 
Bank foreign ownership 0.178**  0.048 0.049 0.020 0.003 0.057* 0.050 0.037 
 (1.973)  (1.428) (1.562) (0.860) (0.145) (1.660) (1.644) (1.052) 
Foreign bank presence  0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.005** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 
  (3.287) (3.419) (3.264) (3.080) (2.285) (3.600) (4.384) (3.437) 
Entry restrictions 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
 (4.498) (4.133) (4.396) (4.626) (6.066) (5.038) (4.492) (6.074) (5.288) 
Private ownership    -0.001      
    (-0.254)      
HHI    -0.074      
    (-1.047)      
Activity restrictions     0.003     
     (0.714)     
Capital requirements     0.018**     
     (2.530)     
Supervisory power     0.004     
     (0.927)     
Manufacturing      -0.010***    
      (-4.461)    
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FDI      -0.000***    
      (-4.235)    
Government spending      0.002***    
      (2.824)    
Financial freedom       0.000   
       (0.337)   
Trade freedom       0.004***   
       (3.853)   
Ideology        -0.006***  
        (-2.705)  
Polity        0.017*  
        (1.801)  
GDP per capita         -0.328* 
         (-1.942) 
Observations 49,948 49,948 49,948 46,782 49,887 49,052 49,871 46,756 49,944 
Wald 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen 0.300 0.642 0.663 0.551 0.726 0.882 0.743 0.944 0.689 
AR1 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.010 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.003 
AR2 0.984 0.605 0.451 0.423 0.985 0.864 0.223 0.402 0.651 
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Table 4. Sensitivity to different Lerner indices and measures of foreign bank presence 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses). The dependent variable in columns I is the Lerner 
index, in II the average Lerner index by country and year, in III the adjusted-Lerner index, and in IV the Lerner index 
obtained from the dual-output cost function. The variables are defined in Table 1. All regressions are estimated with 
the two-step “difference” GMM for dynamic panels and robust standard errors clustered by country. Also, all 
regressions include year-fixed effects. Wald is the p-value of the Wald test, which shows the joint statistical 
significance of the coefficient estimates. Hansen is the p-value of the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions, 
which requires a value higher than 0.05 to accept the null (valid instruments) at the 5% level. AR1 and AR2 are the p-
values of the tests for the first- and- second-order autocorrelation, respectively. All equations include GMM-style 
instruments (lags) and the entry restriction for foreign banks (ERFB, ERFBt-1) as an IV-style instrument. The *, **, 
*** marks denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
I II III IV 
 Dependent variable: Lerner Average Lerner Adj.-Lerner Dual-output Lerner 
Lagged dependent 0.468* 0.374** 0.356*** 0.309*** 
 (1.841) (2.220) (3.252) (7.186) 
Deposits -0.258 -0.376** -0.380*** -0.287 
 (-0.868) (-2.079) (-3.139) (-1.127)    
Capitalization 1.188** -0.039 0.914*** 0.773*** 
 (2.478) (-0.232) (4.325) (2.906) 
Loans 0.095 -0.199* -0.072 -0.152 
 (0.784) (-1.930) (-0.403) (-1.149)    
Bank size 0.037 -0.013 0.010 0.010 
 (1.079) (-0.468) (0.372) (0.329) 
Bank foreign ownership -0.022 0.007 0.031 0.030 
 (-0.705) (0.181) (1.051) (0.895) 
Foreign bank presence in terms of assets  0.004***    
(3.404)    
Foreign bank presence 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 
 (3.217) (2.588) (2.696) 
Entry restrictions 0.036 0.009** 0.016*** 0.008*** 
 (1.283) (2.222) (4.558) (3.304) 
Bank observations 25,902 51,387 47,191 56,046 
Wald 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen 0.19 0.507 0.689 0.421 
AR1 0.07 0.041 0.000 0.000 
AR2 0.94 0.259 0.134 0.443 
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Table 5. Foreign bank presence and market power: Heterogeneous effects 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses). The dependent variable in is the Lerner index. The variables are 
defined in Table 1. All regressions are estimated with the two-step “difference” GMM for dynamic panels and robust standard 
errors clustered by country. Also, all regressions include year-fixed effects. Wald is the p-value of the Wald test, which shows 
the joint statistical significance of the coefficient estimates. Hansen is the p-value of the Hansen test of overidentifying 
restrictions, which requires a value higher than 0.05 to accept the null (valid instruments) at the 5% level. AR1 and AR2 are 
the p-values of the tests for the first- and- second-order autocorrelation, respectively. All equations include GMM-style 
instruments (lags) and the entry restriction for foreign banks (ERFB, ERFBt-1) as an IV-style instrument. The *, **, *** marks 
denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
I II III IV 
 Heterogeneous effects due to: 
 
Capitalization Deposits Entry through 
M&As 
Difference in  
transparency 
Lagged dependent 0.407*** 0.421*** 0.396*** 0.361*** 
 (2.863) (3.308) (3.735) (2.711)    
Deposits -0.487** -0.527** -0.430** -0.343    
 (-1.979) (-2.140) (-2.001) (-1.510)    
Capitalization 0.724*** 0.867*** 0.879*** 0.930*** 
 (2.928) (3.626) (3.427) (3.816)    
Loans -0.052 -0.043 -0.073 0.041    
 (-0.391) (-0.321) (-0.705) (0.306)    
Bank size 0.020 0.075** 0.029 0.044*   
 (0.747) (2.448) (1.246) (1.708)    
Bank foreign ownership 0.034 0.071 0.047 0.048    
 (1.058) (1.379) (1.485) (1.192)    
Foreign bank presence 0.011*** 0.007** 0.007** 0.010**  
 (2.789) (2.241) (1.975) (2.526)    
Entry restrictions 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.019*** 
 (3.954) (3.350) (3.603) (4.666)    
Foreign bank presence * Capitalization -0.022**                 
 (-2.041)                 
Foreign bank presence * Deposits  0.016*  
  (1.760)  
Country M&A’s   0.029  
   (0.446)  
Foreign bank presence * Country M&A’s   0.009**  
   (2.002)  
Foreign bank presence *  
Difference in transparency 
   -0.006*   
   (-1.750)    
Bank observations 49,948 49,948 49,948 48,679 
Wald 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen 0.260 0.223 0.211 0.567 
AR1 0.007 0.002 0.000 0.005 
AR2 0.761 0.583 0.392 0.495 
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Table 6. Foreign bank presence and market power: Heterogeneous effects due to the number of years 
since foreign bank presence reaches a specific threshold 
This table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses). The dependent variable in is the Lerner index. The 
variables are defined in Table 1. All regressions are estimated with the two-step “difference” GMM for dynamic 
panels and robust standard errors clustered by country. Also, all regressions include year-fixed effects. Wald is 
the p-value of the Wald test, which shows the joint statistical significance of the coefficient estimates. Hansen is 
the p-value of the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions, which requires a value higher than 0.05 to accept 
the null (valid instruments) at the 5% level. AR1 and AR2 are the p-values of the tests for the first- and- second-
order autocorrelation, respectively. All equations include GMM-style instruments (lags) and the entry restriction 
for foreign banks (ERFB, ERFBt-1) as an IV-style instrument. The *, **, *** marks denote statistical 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
  I II 
 Heterogeneous effects due to:  
 
Years of foreign ownership>40% Years of foreign ownership>50% 
Lagged dependent 0.431*** 0.426*** 
 (3.693) (3.636)    
Deposits -0.343** -0.348**  
 (-2.013) (-2.247)    
Capitalization 0.730*** 0.839*** 
 (3.647) (4.160)    
Loans -0.014 -0.010    
 (-0.146) (-0.094)    
Bank size 0.030 0.028    
 (1.273) (1.575)    
Bank foreign ownership 0.024 0.004    
 (0.834) (0.340)    
Foreign bank presence 0.005** 0.008*** 
 (2.494) (3.029)    
Entry restrictions 0.014*** 0.015*** 
 (6.692) (5.152)    
Years of foreign ownership -0.037 -0.064*   
 (-1.636) (-1.911)    
Foreign bank presence * Years of 
foreign ownership 
0.001* 0.001**  
(1.720) (1.967)    
Observations 49,905 49,905 
Wald 0.000 0.000 
Hansen 0.728 0.869 
AR1 0.000 0.000 
AR2 0.828 0.758 
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Appendix A. Estimation of bank market power 
Consider a cost equation of the general form: 
, , ,
( , , , )itc itc L itc K itc D itcTC f Q W W W= ,                 (A.1) 
where WL,itc, WK,itc and WD,itc are factor prices of labor, capital and deposits and Qitc is the 
output of each bank i at time t in country c. Because we will be using a semiparametric 
approach to estimate the cost function, the choice of the functional form is not of primary 
significance; hence we aim for simplicity and use a standard log-linear production function. 
Also, we impose the usual linear homogeneity restriction in input prices, that is we normalize 
total cost and the input prices by the price of deposits before taking logs. We end up with the 
following cost function:  
1 2 , 3 , 1ln ln ln ln .itc L itc K itc itcTC b b W b W a Q= + + +              (A.2) 
The PLSC model uses the local polynomial fitting regression and the Gaussian kernel 
function. A thorough theoretical discussion of the PLSC model can be found in Fan and 
Zhang (1999) and Mamuneas, Savvides, and Stengos (2006). Here we only provide a brief 
outline of the econometrics of our method. 
Specifically, and by dropping the t and c subscripts for simplicity, we can write the 
total cost equation in econometric form as follows: 
( ) ( )1 2| .i i i i i i i iY Y W e X V Z eβ β= Ε + = + +               (A.3) 
In this equation, β2 is a function of one or more variables with dimension k added to the 
vector Z, which is an important element of the analysis and will be discussed below. The 
linear part in (A.3) is in line with the idea of the semiparametric model as opposed to a 
nonparametric model (e.g., Zhang, Lee, and Song, 2002). The coefficients of the linear part 
are estimated in the first step as averages of the polynomial fitting by using an initial 
bandwidth chosen by cross-validation (Hoover, Rice, and Wu, 1998). We then average these 
estimates β1i and β2i to receive β1 and β2 in (A.3). In the second step we use the average 
estimates and (A.3) to redefine the dependent variable as follows: 
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( )* *2ˆi i i i i iY Y X V z eβ β≡ − = +  ,               (A.4) 
where the asterisks denote the redefined dependent variable and error term. β2(z) is a vector 
of smooth but unknown functions of zi, estimated using a local least squares approach of the 
form 
1
1 2 1 * 1
2
1 1
ˆ ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ( )] ( ),
n n
j jk k
j j j n n
j j
z z z z
z n V K n V Y K B z C zβ λ λλ λ
−
− − −
= =
 −   −    
= =      
      
∑ ∑     (A.5) 
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j
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−
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Equation (A.5) represents a local constant estimator, where K(z, λ) is a kernel function, λ is 
the smoothing parameter (chosen by generalized cross validation) for sample size n, and k is 
the dimension of zi.  
If we assume that z is a scalar and K is a uniform kernel, then (A.5) can be written as 
follows: 
1
2 *
2
| | | |
ˆ ( )
j j
j j j
z z z z
z V V Y
λ λ
β
−
− ≤ − ≤
   
=    
      
∑ ∑ .               (A.6) 
In (A.6), 2ˆ ( )zβ is a least squares estimator obtained by regressing *jY on jV , using the 
observations of ( jV , *jY ) for which the corresponding zj is close to z, that is, | |jz z λ− ≤ . 
Therefore, to estimate 2ˆ ( )zβ , we only use observations within this “sliding window.” Note 
that no assumptions are made about this estimator globally, but locally—within the sliding 
window—we assume that 2ˆ ( )zβ  can be well-approximated. Also, because 
() is a smooth 
function of z, |
 − 
()| is small when | |jz z−  is small. The condition that nλ is large 
ensures that we have sufficient observations within the interval | |jz z λ− ≤  when 2 ( )jzβ  is 
close to 2( )zβ . Therefore, under the conditions 0λ →  and knλ → ∞  (for k≥1), the local 
least squares regression of *jY on jV  provides a consistent estimate of 2( )zβ  (for a proof, see 
 49 
Li, Huang, Li, and Fu, 2002). Therefore, the estimation method is usually referred to as a 
local regression. 
We can now re-write (A.2) in econometric form as: 
1 1 2, , 3, ,ln ( ) ln ln lnitc itc itc itc L itc itc K itc itcTC b a z Q b W b W e= + + + + ,            (A.7) 
where e is a stochastic disturbance and z is the smoothing variable. The choice of the 
variable(s) to comprise z is a critical issue in the estimation process. The best candidates are 
variables that are highly correlated with a1 and exhibit substantial variation across banks, 
countries and time. In a cost function, the natural candidates to use are the input prices. The 
advantage of this choice is that input prices most certainly affect a1 to a large extent. This has 
been shown many times in estimates of parametric translog cost functions that include 
multiplicative terms of output with input prices. Delis, Iosifidi, and Tsionas (2012) also 
propose using as z the linear combination of input prices, when using the PLSC model. 
Following this paradigm, we define the smoothing variable as zitc = lnWL,itc + lnWK,itc. We 
find that our results are not sensitive to the use of other z functions, such as the product of the 
input prices or linear combinations with different weights. From (A.7) we can obtain the 
marginal cost at the bank-year level as ( )( )1/ /itc itc itc itc itcTC Q a z TC Q∂ ∂ = . We then use the 
estimates of marginal cost and equation (2) to calculate the Lerner index. 
To estimate equation (A.7) and compute the Lerner index we rely on Bankscope as 
our primary source of bank-level data. We focus on commercial banks, savings banks and 
cooperative banks. We exclude real-estate and mortgage banks, investment banks, other non-
banking credit institutions (mainly operating in Germany), specialized governmental credit 
institutions, bank-holding and other holding companies.9 Besides bank-holding companies, 
the excluded institutions are less dependent on the traditional intermediation function and 
have a different financing structure compared to our focus group. In turn, the inclusion of 
bank-holding companies can lead to double counting, as these are corporations controlling 
                                                 
9
 The main activities of the excluded financial institutions relate to the following: provide mortgages; assist 
corporations and governments in a range of services (e.g., M&A’s, raising capital, etc.); provide credit to public 
sectors; provide funding for public or municipal projects.  
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one or more banks. We checked one by one all banks to confirm that we have the subsidiaries 
of these companies in the sample to avoid false exclusion. 
We apply three further selection rules to avoid including duplicates in our sample. 
This is an essential part of the sample-selection process and is absent in most empirical 
studies using the Bankscope database (for a similar strategy with ours, see Claessens and van 
Horen, 2014). First, even though we do not include bank-holding companies, we still need to 
exclude double entries between parent banks and subsidiaries. Bankscope’s consolidation 
code system allows downloading either consolidated or unconsolidated statements, but in 
some cases information on either unconsolidated or consolidated statements of certain banks 
is not available.10 We use either the consolidated or the unconsolidated statement depending 
on which one is available. This is a non-trivial choice and requires the re-examination of all 
banks on an individual basis to avoid double counting. Notably, there are cases of banks with 
subsidiaries in domestic or in foreign countries and one should be very careful in avoiding 
double-counting of subsidiaries that are established, for example, in a foreign country.11 
Second, we account for mergers and acquisitions (M&A’s). We went through all the 
M&A’s one by one and made sure that both banks appear separately in the sample before the 
M&A and only the merged entity or the acquiring bank is included in the sample after the 
event. For example, if bank A and bank B merged in 2005, we create a new entity AB after 
2005 and exclude the separate financial accounts of A and B that might still be reported for 
some time after the merger. We identify M&A’s and their timing using Bankscope and the 
websites of the merging parties. 
                                                 
10
 A consolidated statement is the statement of a bank integrating the statements of its subsidiaries or branches. 
An unconsolidated statement does not integrate subsidiaries. 
11
 Let us provide some examples to clarify this point. Assume that bank A1 is the parent bank with a 
consolidated (C) statement and banks A11, A12 and A13 are subsidiaries with unconsolidated (U) statement. If 
we include all banks in our sample we will have 3 duplicates. Hence, we need to subtract either the percentage 
of the subsidiaries or to exclude the subsidiaries from the sample. The former solution is not feasible because 
we do not have enough information for the percentage and the time duration of the ownership of the 
subsidiaries. Thus, we resort to the later solution. Two other examples for the case of banks with foreign 
subsidiaries that we account for using the same strategy are (i) B1 is a parent bank with a C statement, B11 is a 
subsidiary bank operating in the domestic market with a C or a U statement and B111 is a sub-subsidiary bank 
operating in the domestic market and (ii) B1 is a parent bank with C statement, B12 is a subsidiary bank 
operating abroad with a C or a U statement and B121 is a sub-subsidiary bank operating in the domestic market 
with a U statement.  
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Third, in the US there are quite a few separate banks that have the same name but are 
active in a different state. To solve this issue, we relate the value of total assets of, say, bank i 
in the last year this bank appears in our sample with Bankscope’s identification number for 
bank i. This also allows avoiding problems with our procedure concerning M&A’s described 
above. 
As a final step, we clean our sample from negative values of total assets and total 
expenses. Additionally, we drop 1%  of our sample from each end of the distribution of each 
of the three input prices. This excludes unreasonably high or low input prices (Delis, 2012; 
Claessens and Laeven, 2004). Notably, the initial dataset before all the steps of the cleaning 
process includes 300,180 observations for 21,445 banks operating in 149 countries between 
1997 and 2010. Our final dataset for the estimation of market power consists of 89,778 
observations for 12,206 banks operating in 148 countries between 1997 and 2010. Most of 
the observations dropped are related to some form of double-counting stemming from 
Bankscope’s consolidation system and M&As. This highlights the importance of the data-
cleaning process in generating sensible indices of bank competition. 
In Panel A of Table 1 we define the variables used to estimate the cost function and 
then calculate the Lerner index, and in Panel A of Table 2 we provide summary statistics for 
these variables. To measure bank inputs and outputs we use the intermediation approach, 
which assumes that deposits are inputs used in the production process to produce bank 
outputs. A number of studies have shown this approach to be the preferred one (e.g., Berger 
and Humphrey, 1997; Hughes and Mester, 1993). In particular, we measure bank total costs 
(TC) by real total expenses, and bank output (Q) by real total earning assets. This measure for 
bank output relates to the traditional banking activities and, therefore, our main indices 
reflect competition in these activities. We construct real variables using the GDP deflator 
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(obtained from the World Bank).12 Real total earning assets include loans, securities, and 
other earning assets (such as investments and insurance assets). 
In turn, the three input prices are: WL for the price of labor, which is measured by the 
ratio of personnel expenses to total assets;13 WK for the price of physical capital, measured by 
the ratio of capital expenditures to fixed assets; and WD for the price of deposits, which is 
measured as total interest expenses over total customer deposits. For the Lerner index we 
also need a proxy for the output price (P), which is calculated as the ratio of total income 
over total earning assets (e.g., Beck, Jonghe, and Schepens, 2013). 
Finally, to estimate the dual-output Lerner index we use the following cost function: 
1 1 1, 2 2, 2, , 3, ,ln ( ) ln ln ln lnitc itc itc itc itc L itc itc K itc itcTC b a z Q a Q b W b W e= + + + + + ,           (A.8)  
where Q1 equals Q in the previous cost equations and Q2 is the total value of off-balance sheet 
items. Given that we focus on the market power stemming from traditional banking activities, 
marginal cost is still derived from ( )( )1, 1 1,/ /itc itc itc itcTC Q a z TC Q∂ ∂ = . 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
12
 As is standard in the macroeconomics literature, for Taiwan we use the GDP deflator of China and for 
Netherlands Antilles we use the GDP deflator of Aruba. 
13
 We divide by total assets instead of the number of employees because Bankscope has limited information on 
the number of employees. The related literature follows a similar approach (e.g., Delis, 2012; Claessens and 
Laeven, 2004). 
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Appendix B. Average estimates of market power (weighted by market shares) using the Lerner index 
This table reports average estimates of market power (weighted by market shares) by country and year. Averages are obtained from the bank-level estimates of market power using the Lerner 
index, as this is defined in equation (1). Higher values reflect higher market power (lower competition). 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Mean 
Afghanistan 0.381 0.237 0.084 0.362 0.299 0.147 0.252 
Albania 0.120 0.321 0.210 0.201 0.184 0.215 0.293 0.274 0.317 0.303 0.318 0.359 0.223 
Algeria 0.153 0.165 0.065 0.153 0.229 0.387 0.244 0.459 0.590 0.648 0.533 0.624 0.528 0.513 0.378 
Andorra 0.255 0.296 0.354 0.359 0.305 0.373 0.459 0.505 0.505 0.507 0.439 0.281 0.386 
Angola 0.275 0.313 0.281 0.397 0.498 0.427 0.412 0.267 0.459 0.492 0.427 0.467 0.393 
Antigua and Barbuda 0.051 0.090 0.123 0.133 0.266 0.334 0.344 0.192 
Argentina 0.217 0.170 0.189 0.218 0.136 0.121 0.019 0.167 0.257 0.285 0.245 0.209 0.325 0.318 0.205 
Armenia 0.182 0.235 0.215 0.188 0.280 0.348 0.375 0.389 0.374 0.364 0.354 0.329 0.226 0.284 0.296 
Australia 0.253 0.248 0.211 0.285 -0.085 0.225 0.250 0.233 0.218 0.165 0.250 0.251 0.209 
Austria 0.147 0.122 0.132 0.146 0.145 0.154 0.189 0.185 0.182 0.174 0.166 0.151 0.206 0.260 0.168 
Azerbaijan 0.533 0.370 0.377 0.535 0.436 0.382 0.375 0.435 0.441 0.388 0.388 0.411 0.380 0.275 0.409 
Bahamas, The 0.159 0.173 0.210 0.272 0.294 0.214 0.321 0.356 0.393 0.388 0.421 0.333 0.391 0.390 0.308 
Bahrain 0.205 0.177 0.175 0.161 0.177 0.239 0.223 0.284 0.265 0.201 0.189 0.232 0.211 
Bangladesh 0.030 -0.033 0.070 0.114 0.134 0.142 0.138 0.164 0.214 0.189 0.211 0.256 0.275 0.339 0.160 
Belarus 0.092 0.209 0.112 0.178 0.120 0.183 0.168 0.150 0.182 0.211 0.186 0.174 0.241 0.246 0.175 
Belgium 0.103 0.138 0.145 0.162 0.166 0.150 0.161 0.158 0.122 0.143 0.071 -0.016 0.079 0.155 0.124 
Bermuda 0.097 0.114 0.118 0.156 0.120 0.194 0.210 0.131 0.269 0.266 0.274 0.128 0.211 0.229 0.180 
Bolivia 0.138 0.186 0.206 0.179 0.194 0.239 0.203 0.145 0.177 0.221 0.238 0.300 0.261 0.274 0.211 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.215 0.237 0.233 0.256 0.183 0.230 0.251 0.229 
Botswana 0.246 0.307 0.248 0.324 0.326 0.338 0.353 0.337 0.357 0.328 0.269 0.294 0.309 0.336 0.312 
Brazil 0.137 0.160 0.155 0.132 0.144 0.161 0.228 0.219 0.244 0.274 0.278 0.195 0.294 0.259 0.206 
Bulgaria 0.309 0.283 0.339 0.360 0.372 0.378 0.385 0.338 0.323 0.343 0.343 
Burkina Faso 0.277 0.386 0.337 0.270 0.236 0.350 0.348 0.317 0.342 0.306 0.308 0.246 0.266 0.346 0.310 
Cambodia 0.478 0.469 0.337 0.386 0.436 0.436 0.450 0.484 0.517 0.379 0.363 0.430 
Cameroon 0.580 0.499 0.451 0.420 0.385 0.479 0.432 0.426 0.435 0.390 0.314 0.345 0.430 
Canada 0.135 0.108 0.179 0.168 0.166 0.194 0.202 0.229 0.187 0.215 0.190 0.152 0.258 0.304 0.192 
Cayman Islands 0.176 0.176 
Chile 0.161 0.160 0.204 0.206 0.238 0.283 0.194 0.150 0.160 0.228 0.308 0.217 0.411 0.383 0.236 
China 0.405 0.383 0.254 0.275 0.259 0.346 0.379 0.399 0.385 0.390 0.429 0.407 0.417 0.449 0.370 
Colombia 0.146 0.081 0.030 0.085 0.146 0.152 0.244 0.283 0.322 0.279 0.312 0.318 0.341 0.379 0.223 
Costa Rica 0.073 0.084 0.076 0.182 0.185 0.183 0.235 0.220 0.214 0.226 0.213 0.175 0.145 0.222 0.174 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.379 0.386 0.322 0.300 0.263 0.241 0.230 0.273 0.266 0.276 0.303 0.286 0.277 0.263 0.290 
Croatia 0.209 0.167 0.169 0.226 0.202 0.215 0.251 0.271 0.282 0.257 0.268 0.253 0.274 0.301 0.239 
Cuba 0.824 0.761 0.731 0.689 0.569 0.703 0.785 0.787 0.701 0.611 0.470 0.557 0.536 0.651 0.670 
Cyprus 0.155 0.151 0.284 0.107 0.111 0.143 0.176 0.208 0.188 0.253 0.284 0.202 0.233 0.249 0.196 
Czech Republic 0.180 0.158 0.167 0.166 0.162 0.239 0.267 0.298 0.343 0.328 0.328 0.277 0.440 0.444 0.271 
Denmark 0.165 0.175 0.141 0.147 0.251 0.265 0.390 0.180 0.184 0.161 0.135 0.104 0.218 0.213 0.195 
Dominican Republic 0.189 0.180 0.166 0.190 0.190 0.198 0.175 0.115 0.184 0.202 0.220 0.226 0.220 0.266 0.194 
Ecuador 0.050 -0.124 0.297 0.127 0.113 0.185 0.197 0.227 0.268 0.276 0.268 0.241 0.234 0.265 0.187 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.065 0.065 0.314 0.238 0.171 
El Salvador 0.119 0.169 0.166 0.178 0.244 0.288 0.282 0.304 0.326 0.365 0.359 0.365 0.380 0.447 0.285 
Estonia 0.262 0.029 0.014 0.052 0.204 0.271 0.328 0.347 0.341 0.364 0.323 0.313 0.286 0.373 0.251 
Ethiopia 0.270 0.257 0.344 0.285 0.406 0.331 0.574 0.573 0.574 0.612 0.538 0.616 0.650 0.595 0.473 
Finland 0.055 0.000 0.338 0.354 0.266 0.207 0.174 0.188 0.194 0.118 0.267 0.280 0.203 
France 0.100 0.107 0.128 0.112 0.132 0.152 0.168 0.205 0.220 0.221 0.197 0.172 0.229 0.248 0.171 
Gambia, The 0.495 0.569 0.551 0.552 0.529 0.530 0.437 0.401 0.417 0.272 0.330 0.253 0.317 0.435 
Georgia 0.335 0.362 0.318 0.339 0.341 0.341 0.316 0.351 0.333 0.282 0.262 0.230 0.235 0.311 
Germany 0.171 0.151 0.164 0.139 0.132 0.157 0.175 0.189 0.185 0.204 0.166 0.153 0.193 0.234 0.172 
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Ghana 0.160 0.442 0.419 0.137 0.412 0.414 0.435 0.483 0.442 0.293 0.274 0.241 0.324 0.344 
Greece 0.169 0.201 0.404 0.215 0.000 0.044 0.112 0.136 0.183 0.216 0.173 0.104 0.184 0.151 0.164 
Guatemala 0.088 0.124 0.126 0.186 0.228 0.246 0.251 0.242 0.253 0.248 0.257 0.204 
Haiti 0.123 0.119 0.116 0.172 0.156 0.108 0.224 0.099 0.145 0.171 0.178 0.197 0.183 0.183 0.155 
Honduras 0.338 0.262 0.186 0.129 0.165 0.197 0.256 0.180 0.205 0.240 0.250 0.272 0.233 0.208 0.223 
Hong Kong SAR, China 0.238 0.187 0.243 0.273 0.165 0.351 0.389 0.429 0.300 0.276 0.260 0.176 0.299 0.343 0.281 
Hungary 0.153 0.144 0.087 0.122 0.163 0.181 0.226 0.219 0.245 0.243 0.250 0.192 0.223 0.313 0.197 
Iceland 0.167 0.175 0.200 0.068 0.145 0.210 0.231 0.269 0.336 0.363 0.331 0.426 0.337 0.489 0.268 
India 0.121 0.146 0.120 0.158 0.158 0.209 0.244 0.303 0.282 0.266 0.241 0.186 0.194 0.211 0.203 
Indonesia 0.134 0.043 0.030 0.107 0.129 0.160 0.228 0.325 0.248 0.256 0.295 0.311 0.315 0.356 0.210 
Iraq 0.463 0.316 0.389 
Ireland 0.177 0.175 0.253 0.215 0.148 0.135 0.228 0.217 0.144 0.132 0.146 0.146 0.196 0.205 0.180 
Israel 0.153 0.064 0.092 0.124 0.084 0.102 0.116 0.177 0.150 0.198 0.206 0.141 0.197 0.108 0.136 
Italy 0.157 0.200 0.143 0.203 0.183 0.218 0.218 0.179 0.241 0.258 0.240 0.198 0.238 0.236 0.208 
Jamaica 0.128 0.158 0.201 0.289 0.216 0.271 0.233 0.267 0.278 0.271 0.301 0.293 0.334 0.249 
Japan 0.246 0.246 0.259 0.259 0.250 0.230 0.266 0.261 0.282 0.285 0.286 0.242 0.191 0.233 0.253 
Jordan 0.152 0.182 0.173 0.147 0.239 0.237 0.325 0.362 0.490 0.400 0.363 0.349 0.370 0.419 0.301 
Kazakhstan 0.245 0.310 0.306 0.246 0.347 0.366 0.359 0.393 0.356 0.329 0.340 0.243 0.230 0.077 0.296 
Kenya 0.153 0.262 0.270 0.311 0.321 0.318 0.380 0.371 0.361 0.391 0.369 0.344 0.326 0.384 0.326 
Korea, Rep. 0.071 0.115 0.219 0.179 0.266 0.311 0.316 0.331 0.310 0.291 0.271 0.191 0.221 0.258 0.239 
Kuwait 0.092 0.239 0.287 0.299 0.367 0.444 0.517 0.555 0.565 0.470 0.393 0.384 
Kyrgyz Republic 0.176 0.323 0.116 0.371 0.375 0.460 0.365 0.397 0.454 0.319 0.359 0.327 0.337 
Lao PDR 0.232 0.019 0.000 0.252 0.478 0.555 0.669 0.292 0.285 0.353 0.314 
Latvia 0.280 0.214 0.257 0.280 0.271 0.303 0.337 0.356 0.362 0.327 0.305 0.241 0.247 0.227 0.286 
Lebanon 0.168 0.149 0.141 0.144 0.127 0.141 0.163 0.142 0.151 0.149 0.144 0.179 0.190 0.226 0.158 
Libya 0.535 0.576 0.535 0.050 0.401 0.523 0.597 0.691 0.248 0.462 
Lithuania 0.269 0.154 0.242 0.151 0.183 0.217 0.184 0.252 0.289 0.306 0.311 0.245 0.178 0.205 0.228 
Luxembourg 0.103 0.095 0.115 0.134 0.118 0.134 0.151 0.189 0.207 0.198 0.184 0.137 0.242 0.285 0.164 
Macao SAR, China 0.127 0.132 0.166 0.184 0.190 0.290 0.354 0.396 0.366 0.296 0.280 0.325 0.395 0.423 0.280 
Macedonia, FYR 0.498 0.353 0.346 0.297 0.303 0.265 0.317 0.317 0.359 0.359 0.365 0.314 0.261 0.242 0.328 
Madagascar 0.555 0.565 0.507 0.377 0.321 0.356 0.451 0.458 0.471 0.492 0.441 0.337 0.271 0.260 0.419 
Malawi 0.420 0.460 0.443 0.390 0.263 0.357 0.360 0.371 0.390 0.491 0.525 0.438 0.422 0.360 0.406 
Malaysia 0.277 0.246 0.271 0.362 0.344 0.355 0.351 0.352 0.355 0.353 0.360 0.366 0.362 0.409 0.340 
Mali 0.252 0.266 0.298 0.253 0.324 0.307 0.335 0.304 0.311 0.367 0.325 0.304 0.321 0.286 0.304 
Malta 0.214 0.217 0.249 0.226 0.225 0.239 0.273 0.307 0.345 0.339 0.336 0.292 0.310 0.362 0.281 
Mauritania 0.574 0.505 0.313 0.340 0.186 0.463 0.466 0.275 0.277 0.431 0.333 0.378 
Mauritius 0.174 0.198 0.180 0.183 0.204 0.326 0.279 0.324 0.330 0.279 0.262 0.284 0.304 0.399 0.266 
Mexico 0.011 0.002 0.063 0.017 0.280 -0.025 -0.023 0.046 
Moldova 0.353 0.388 0.401 0.413 0.380 0.384 0.408 0.351 0.289 0.341 0.340 0.284 0.222 0.309 0.347 
Mongolia 0.316 0.220 0.272 0.255 0.226 0.263 0.214 0.167 0.200 0.219 0.207 0.190 0.229 
Montenegro 0.000 0.275 0.238 0.161 0.204 0.256 0.205 0.197 0.231 0.196 
Morocco 0.217 0.237 0.217 0.294 0.310 0.329 0.329 0.375 0.305 0.337 0.336 0.359 0.354 0.364 0.312 
Mozambique 0.263 0.236 0.319 0.259 0.279 0.272 0.194 0.238 0.259 0.340 0.368 0.375 0.385 0.356 0.296 
Namibia 0.183 0.023 0.490 0.425 0.270 0.255 0.256 0.249 0.241 0.270 0.266 
Nepal 0.355 0.247 0.319 0.362 0.357 0.348 0.231 0.258 0.273 0.311 0.292 0.333 0.326 0.283 0.307 
Netherlands Antilles 0.114 0.142 0.210 0.130 0.129 0.145 
Netherlands 0.126 0.127 0.143 0.204 0.213 0.109 0.094 0.160 0.154 0.135 0.177 0.183 0.149 0.256 0.159 
New Zealand 0.121 0.085 0.230 0.207 0.226 0.272 0.249 0.200 0.211 0.196 0.173 0.204 0.198 
Nicaragua 0.201 0.220 0.237 0.295 0.327 0.342 0.370 0.379 0.367 0.304 
Niger 0.261 0.399 0.066 0.206 0.145 0.206 0.143 0.233 0.304 0.322 0.265 0.352 0.336 0.328 0.255 
Nigeria 0.228 0.290 0.304 0.276 0.296 0.268 0.275 0.264 0.313 0.317 0.309 0.325 0.195 0.224 0.277 
Norway 0.169 0.061 0.146 0.157 0.155 0.128 0.159 0.219 0.265 0.230 0.176 0.146 0.266 0.263 0.181 
Oman 0.309 0.274 0.283 0.258 0.301 0.392 0.398 0.428 0.423 0.420 0.378 0.429 0.464 0.366 
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Pakistan 0.040 0.023 -0.014 0.045 0.119 0.185 0.259 0.270 0.395 0.368 0.321 0.277 0.288 0.276 0.204 
Panama 0.196 0.134 0.317 0.259 0.255 0.300 0.363 0.322 0.306 0.275 0.320 0.311 0.305 0.313 0.284 
Papua New Guinea 0.250 0.259 0.088 0.401 0.641 0.520 0.504 0.611 0.614 0.530 0.490 0.446 
Paraguay 0.278 0.181 0.104 0.041 0.092 0.015 -0.114 0.052 0.140 0.131 0.133 0.208 0.168 0.216 0.118 
Peru 0.219 0.203 0.184 0.160 0.174 0.259 0.295 0.315 0.357 0.364 0.351 0.387 0.438 0.390 0.293 
Philippines 0.264 0.272 0.177 0.001 0.065 0.214 0.298 0.237 0.239 0.248 0.239 0.193 0.278 0.325 0.218 
Poland 0.170 0.175 0.162 0.165 0.166 0.169 0.137 0.174 0.190 0.239 0.246 0.215 0.232 0.241 0.192 
Portugal 0.119 0.131 0.104 0.168 0.305 0.202 0.230 0.294 0.198 0.162 0.138 0.082 0.087 0.065 0.163 
Qatar 0.242 0.318 0.471 0.522 0.514 0.551 0.435 0.398 0.370 0.375 0.420 
Romania 0.233 0.215 0.214 0.199 0.247 0.190 0.202 0.262 0.236 0.221 0.209 0.224 0.234 0.278 0.226 
Russian Federation 0.207 0.061 0.410 0.377 0.454 0.344 0.310 0.339 0.307 0.297 0.282 0.272 0.239 0.202 0.293 
Rwanda 0.187 0.205 0.257 0.109 0.004 0.320 0.352 0.343 0.249 0.343 0.237 
San Marino 0.185 0.262 0.400 0.397 0.328 0.335 0.435 0.506 0.504 0.460 0.382 0.195 0.366 
Saudi Arabia 0.263 0.261 0.254 0.247 0.311 0.405 0.490 0.501 0.490 0.488 0.340 0.225 0.362 0.288 0.352 
Senegal 0.356 0.428 0.351 0.344 0.364 0.352 0.345 0.342 0.330 0.340 0.307 0.327 0.297 0.281 0.340 
Serbia 0.374 0.472 0.362 0.336 0.217 0.249 0.228 0.234 0.176 0.294 
Seychelles 0.198 0.508 0.559 0.567 0.595 0.594 0.377 0.528 0.491 
Sierra Leone 0.190 0.400 0.646 0.535 0.481 0.474 0.519 0.472 0.386 0.287 0.188 0.247 0.328 0.396 
Singapore 0.248 0.232 0.362 0.353 0.297 0.230 0.414 0.361 0.309 0.331 0.376 0.489 0.438 0.342 
Slovak Republic 0.092 0.032 0.029 0.142 0.158 0.183 0.216 0.246 0.267 0.291 0.284 0.304 0.322 0.390 0.211 
Slovenia 0.214 0.213 0.224 0.238 0.188 0.210 0.214 0.252 0.266 0.252 0.249 0.184 0.237 0.269 0.229 
South Africa 0.105 0.163 0.167 0.179 0.204 0.300 0.211 0.177 0.155 0.233 0.222 0.199 0.217 0.229 0.197 
Spain 0.130 0.161 0.228 0.181 0.179 0.196 0.238 0.275 0.242 0.246 0.229 0.207 0.292 0.305 0.222 
Sri Lanka 0.149 0.177 0.114 0.102 0.094 0.150 0.224 0.210 0.210 0.196 0.171 0.146 0.171 0.232 0.168 
Sudan 0.395 0.266 0.246 0.258 0.145 0.317 0.180 0.291 0.257 0.277 0.171 0.223 0.193 0.214 0.245 
Sweden 0.186 0.168 0.156 0.182 0.183 0.169 0.206 0.277 0.234 0.224 0.178 0.160 0.223 0.244 0.199 
Switzerland 0.168 0.132 0.126 0.156 0.124 0.165 0.179 0.180 0.122 0.125 0.039 0.036 0.129 0.179 0.133 
Syrian Arab Republic 0.000 0.064 0.309 0.568 0.569 0.567 0.346 
Taiwan 0.159 0.165 0.227 0.349 0.283 0.307 0.278 0.248 0.218 0.294 0.342 0.261 
Tanzania 0.471 0.439 0.390 0.423 0.395 0.392 0.357 0.343 0.401 
Thailand 0.171 0.011 0.045 0.106 0.148 0.233 0.290 0.375 0.375 0.288 0.289 0.334 0.369 0.389 0.245 
Togo 0.111 0.191 0.216 0.446 0.225 0.129 0.276 0.315 0.259 0.307 0.259 0.282 0.244 0.344 0.258 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.195 0.193 0.231 0.266 0.284 0.302 0.360 0.347 0.309 0.321 0.338 0.345 0.313 0.442 0.303 
Tunisia 0.562 0.557 0.458 0.302 0.292 0.267 0.189 0.208 0.221 0.285 0.295 0.323 0.331 0.346 0.331 
Turkey 0.022 0.034 0.143 0.046 -0.017 0.112 0.190 0.240 0.286 0.226 0.227 0.209 0.335 0.320 0.169 
Uganda 0.401 0.360 0.368 0.341 0.367 
Ukraine 0.229 0.269 0.316 0.211 0.229 0.182 0.245 0.233 0.221 0.243 0.220 0.314 0.250 0.214 0.241 
United Arab Emirates 0.307 0.298 0.314 0.295 0.340 0.462 0.507 0.516 0.516 0.359 0.346 0.372 0.453 0.468 0.397 
United Kingdom 0.182 0.184 0.177 0.243 0.110 0.169 0.282 0.292 0.254 0.241 0.236 0.103 0.294 0.308 0.220 
United States 0.239 0.229 0.252 0.224 0.266 0.332 0.355 0.321 0.304 0.268 0.227 0.239 0.344 0.352 0.282 
Uruguay 0.072 0.076 0.073 0.097 0.037 0.248 0.013 0.241 0.090 0.190 0.269 0.363 0.181 0.250 0.157 
Uzbekistan 0.378 0.307 0.301 0.371 0.364 0.321 0.223 0.181 0.239 0.275 0.283 0.229 0.212 0.248 0.281 
Venezuela, RB 0.291 0.283 0.217 0.182 0.226 0.301 0.327 0.343 0.276 0.293 0.281 0.263 0.265 0.306 0.275 
Vietnam 0.379 0.346 0.314 0.345 0.264 0.292 0.273 0.349 0.336 0.282 0.277 0.208 0.198 0.205 0.291 
Yemen, Rep. 0.055 0.226 0.231 0.200 0.272 0.242 0.204 
Zambia 0.047 0.172 0.117 0.194 0.234 0.224 0.101 0.233 0.296 0.340 0.340 0.299 0.337 0.288 0.230 
Zimbabwe 0.297 0.299 0.298 
Mean 0.212 0.207 0.226 0.230 0.228 0.255 0.280 0.298 0.299 0.301 0.294 0.277 0.290 0.305 0.266 
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Figure 1 
Evolution of the average Lerner indices by year 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Foreign bank presence and banks’ market power 
 
 
 
